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1. Severa l categories of vanity numbers ha ve been identified:
(1) numbers th at correspo n d t o  th e spelling of a product, such a s “1-800-
F LOWERS”; (2) num bers th at correspond to lett ers th at spell a bus iness
nam e, su ch a s “1-800 -HO LID AY”; (3) nu mb er s t ha t b egin  wit h “4” or  “2” and
end with  a  p roduct , ser vice, or bu sine ss n am e su ch as  “1-800-4-TRAVEL,”
or  “1-800-2-GO-WEST ”; (4) nu mb er s t ha t on ly pa rt ial ly sp ell a  pr odu ct or
com pany na me, su ch as  “486-HAIR,” . . . ; (5) nu mber s th at  ar e eas ily
remembered, s u ch  as “1-800-8000”; an d (6) num bers  th at  ar e hea vily
m arketed,  but oth erwise lack dist inctiveness, su ch as “1-800-325-3535,”
wh ich  Shera ton Hotels ma de into a jingle.
Lisa D. Dam e, Comm ent , Con fu sin gly D iss im ila r A ppl icat ion s of Trademark Law to
Vani ty Telephone Num bers, 46 CATH . U. L. RE V. 1199, n.1 (1997), (citing In re Toll
Free  Se rv ice Acce ss Codes, Report an d Order , 11 F.C.C.R. 2496, 2497 (1996)
[hereinafter  Order] (giving examples of vanity telephone nu mbers)); Commen ts  of
Amer it ech  Opera ting Compa nies, to th e Notice of Proposed Rule Ma king in CC Dkt .
No. 95-1 55,  at  30 (N ov. 2 , 19 95) [h er ein aft er  Com me nt s of Am er it ech ].
2. The mn emon ic mar k “1-800-FLOWERS ®,” for examp le, was originally gran ted
t r ademark regis tr at ion on Apr il 29, 1975. S ee Principal Register, Un ited Stat es Pat ent
and Trade mar k Office, Registrat ion No. 1,009,717.
3. P RETTY WOMAN  (Tou chs ton e P ict ur es  199 0).
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Telephone Mnem onics an d Complement ar y
Nu mber s: A Review of Tra dem ar k a nd  Un fair
Com pe t it ion  La w a nd P olicy
I. IN T R O D U C T I O N
 Teleph on e mn emonics, or van ity nu mber s , a r e numbers
repr esent ed by th eir  corre spon din g le t t er s  from the  t elephone
dia l  or  k e ypa d,  wh ich sp el l—eith er  l i te ra l ly  or
phone t ica l ly—catchy words, phrases, tradem arks, or names. 1
Since as early as th e 1970s,2 es pe cia lly  followin g t he a dven t  of
nationwide “800” toll-free teleph one service, telephone mn e-
monics  have b ecom e a  ubiq u it ous p ar t  of Amer ica n  advert isin g
and cultu re. Nu mber s su ch as 1-800-COLLECT ®,  1-800-DOMI-
NOS ®, an d 1-800-FLOWERS ® have  became  so common  as  to
slip  into everyday sp eech  and s how u p in  pop ula r  cult u re. F or
examp le, in  the pop u la r  film “Pret ty Woma n,” when  high -soci-
ety mill ionaire Edwa rd Lewis (played by Richard  Gere) was
ask ed where he found his beautiful date (played by J ul ia Rob-
e r t s), he t ur ne d a nd  re spon ded  wit h a  wr y grin , “976-BABE.”3
This  quip , of cour se, wa s h um orous  only becau se ever yone in
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4. S ee Dam e, supra  no te  1, a t 1 245  (“Th e a pp lica ti on of t he  la w by  courts  t o
van ity te lep ho ne  nu mb er s . .  . h as  bee n i nco ns ist en t a nd  ofte n i na pp ro pr ia te .”).
the au dience inst an tly un ders tood it as a  referen ce to the t ele-
phone n um ber of some ima ginar y escort  service.
But  no sooner  ha d mn emonic telephone n um bers a ppear ed
on the scene th an  bus ines s owne rs  found a  cra fty wa y to exploit
the adver t is in g effor t s of th eir  compet itors by usin g complem en-
t a ry num bers. Competitors soon discovered th at  consu mer s who
dia l mn emon ic teleph one n um ber s occasiona lly misd ial a nd
sometim es subst itut e a zero for t he lett er “O,” or th e nu mber
one for th e letter “I.” These resulting misdials are called com-
p lemen ta ry nu mber s because, if writt en out , they r esemble t he
actua l mnemonic, but  ar e nu mer ically differen t. By p ur cha sin g
the right s to nu mber s t ha t  complem en t  es tabli sh ed , fa mous
mn emon ic nu mber s, ma rk et competit ors can somet imes
ins ta nt ly grab a  s ignificant  share  of the  market in t he  same
bu sin ess  wit h lit tle  or n o adve rt isin g.
Not  surprisingly, t h is  pr act ice h as s pa wn ed  numer ous
l awsu it s un der  tr ad ema rk  an d u nfa ir comp etit ion laws.
However , judicial resolution of these disputes has been
incons is tent 4 an d h as  ten ded t o focus s olely on  t ra dema rk la w,
while  u n fa i r com p et i t ion  con s id er a t ions h ave been
misunderst ood, misapplied, or sim ply pu t in  th e ba cksea t. Th is
Commen t  wil l con side r  the cu r r e n t  st an da rd  of protect ion
afforded  complem e n tary telephone num bers against the
backdrop of t r ademark  and  unfa ir comp et ition  law  an d policy,
and a t t em pt  to su ggest  a  ra t ion a l fr amework for  cou r t s  t o
follow  in r esolvin g th ese d ispu te s. P ar t II wil l review the
backgr ound, h i story , and  major  deci sions  in  t r ademark  law as
app lied to t eleph one n um ber s a nd  mn emon ics an d r eview, in
pa r t icu lar , th e gener icness  doctr ine. Pa rt  III will examine t he
Sixt h  Circuit’s t rea tm ent  of complem ent ar y nu mbe rs  in
Holiday Inns, Inc. v . 80 0 R eserva ti on , In c in ligh t of th is
backgr ound. Pa rt  IV will an alyze  th e cas e la w, h ist ory, a nd
policies th at  un der lie u nfa ir comp et ition  law  in t his  ar ea . Pa r t
V su ggest s a n a na lytica l th eory t o gu ide fu ture d ecis ion s
regard ing complementa ry  numbers  based  on  the  policies
under lying the  Lanham Act  and  other  general  policies of law
and econ omics . P ar t  VI con cludes  th at  th is t heor y, which
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5. S ee Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Caban a, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 779-80 (1992)
(Stevens, J. concu rr ing).
6. S ee 1 J.  TH O M A S  MCCA RT H Y, MCCA R TH Y  O N  TR A D E M AR KS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION  §§ 2:2 -:3 (4t h e d. 1 998 ).
7. S ee Sunbea m P rods., In c. v. West Ben d Co., 123 F.3d 24 6, 252, 260 (5th  Cir.
199 7).
8. S ee id . at  260  (“Tra dem ar k law  accommoda tes [it s] counte rva iling pu blic
policies by l im it in g t ra de ma rk  pr ote cti on  to d ist in cti ve,  no n-fu nct ion al  ma rk s.”).
9. S ee Dr an off-Per lst ein  Ass ocs.  v. S kl ar , 96 7 F .2d  852 , 85 5 (3d  Cir . 19 92).
10. Za ta ra ins, Inc. v. Oak  Grove Sm okehou se, In c., 698 F.2d 786, 790  (5th Cir .
198 3).
imposes a  du ty on bu sin esse s t o preven t confus ion, would  bett er
a llow  the Lanham Act  to pe r form it s in ten de d fu nct ion .
II. TR A D E M A RK  LAW , NU M B E R S , A N D  MN E M O N I C S
 Trademarks  receive lega l pr ot ect ion  on ly to the exten t  tha t
th ey serve t o designat e th e source, or igin , or  a ffilia t ion  of goods
or  services.5 From a  pol icy s t andp oin t , lega l protect ion  of su ch
des igna t ions is consid er ed be ne ficial becau se d ist inct ive
t radem arks sim ult an eous ly encou ra ge economic efficiency a nd
the p roduct ion of high qu ality goods an d services.6 I n  t he same
vein,  the value of mnemonic telephone numbers lies in th eir
abilit y to stick in the customers’ memories an d  gu ide them to a
provider  of goods or ser vices. To the ex t en t  t rademarks  and
tele ph one mn em onics se rve  th ese s imila r p ur poses , an y
discu ssion  of t he  unfa i r compet i t ion  a spect s  of t e lephone
mn emon ics a n d complem ent ar y num bers m ust  be viewed
against  t he  backdrop of tra dem ar k la w. Thu s, before d iving into
a  discu ssion  of tra demark  case law an d hist ory as t hey rela te t o
t e le ph one mn emon ics, it is fir st  pr oper t o review t he b as ic
principles of tr adem ar k law.
A. Bas ic Princip les  of T ra dem ar k  Protect ion
1. Distinctiveness
 The tou chst one of tr ad ema rk  eligibility is  distinctiveness;7
the level of p rotect ion  a fforded  to a  mark  depends  on  how
dist inct ive it is .8 Tra dema rk s ar e divided into four  genera l
ca tegories of distin ctiveness: ar bitra ry or fanciful; suggestive;
descriptive; an d gen eric.9 The lines between  th ese categories
a re somewhat indistinct and a re considered “more advisory
than  defin ition al.”10 Nevert heless, m ar ks t ha t a re a djudged
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11. S ee Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hun ting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 11 (2d C ir .
1976) ( “I f a  t e rm is  sugges t ive,  i t  is  en ti tl ed  to r egi st ra ti on  . . . .  [F ]an ciful or
a rb it r a ry te rm s e nj oy a ll t he  ri gh ts  acco rd ed  to s ug ges ti ve t er ms  . . . . ”).
12. S ee Zatarains,  698 F.2d at  790-91.
13. S ee id. a t  791; see also Dranoff-Perlstein , 967 F.2d at 855. It has been
argued  tha t  Kell ogg Co. v . N ati ona l B iscu it C o., 305 U.S. 111 (1938) cre at ed a  mi nor
excep tion  to the genericness rule.  S ee Dam e, supra  not e 1, at  1208-09. Kellogg held
tha t  under common law unfair competition principles the  fir s t  use r  of  a  gener ic  mark
(SHREDDED WH EAT  in  th at  cas e) in  a p ar ti cul ar  ma rk et  could r equir e a junior user
to r easonab ly  di st inguish i ts  pr odu ct in  ord er  to p re ven t a ny  lik elih ood of confu sion .
S ee Kellogg,  305 U.S. at 119. This principle is  not  accura te ly descr ibed  as  an
excep tion  to  the  ru le . Enfo rcemen t  of  t h e L a n h a m Act relat ed to a generic term  does
no t amoun t to tr adema rk en forceme n t  a t  all. Un der t he La nh am  Act, unfa ir
comp et iti on  law ex ten ds beyon d tr ade ma rk s to “an y word, t e r m, na me , sym bol, or
device” th at  is likely t o cause  confusion. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1994). The stat ute
mak es no  men t ion  o f a  mark, regis ter ed or ot her wise. See id.  While  it  i s  t rue tha t
unr egistered  marks  may be p ro te cte d a s com mo n l aw  tr ad em ar ks  un de r §  43(a ) of th e
Lanham Act, see, e.g., Banff, Ltd. v. Federat ed Dept. St ores, Inc., 841 F.2d 486, 489
(2d Cir. 1988) (noting that  § 43(a) of the La n h a m  Ac t  “protects not only registered
tradema rks, but u nregister ed m a r ks  . . . a s we ll”), th e sa me  pr inci ple s of
distinctiveness apply as with registered mark s. S ee Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Caban a,
Inc.,  505 U.S. 763, 768 (1992). Thus, wheth er tr adema rk infringem ent is alleged
under  § 32 or  § 43(a ), a g en er ic m a r k  ca n  r eceive  no protect ion as  a  t rademark.
However , because of the greater  breadt h of unfair competition law, a mar ket
pa r t ic ipan t usin g a gen eric m ar k could st ill claim u nfair  competit ion gene ra lly,
regardless of the u se of a mark. Thu s, the holder of a gener i c mark  ma y still obta in
som e prot ection  un der  un fair com pet ition  law. S ee infra  P a r t  IV and  accompanying
notes.
14. Murphy Door Bed Co. v. Int erior Slee p Sys ., Inc., 874 F .2d 95, 100 (2d Cir .
198 9).
15. Wil li am M. Lan des & R ichar d A. Posn er, Trademark  Law: An  Economic
Perspective, 30 J.L.  & E CON . 265 , 27 6 (19 87).
a rb it ra ry or suggestive ar e au toma tically protected. 1 1
Descr ipt ive ma rk s, however, can only be r egi st er ed  upon  a
showing tha t  t h e ma rk  ha s develope d second ar y mea nin g
dur ing th e period of its use.12 Fina lly, generic ma rk s can n ever
rece ive t rademark  p rotect ion .13
A generic term is defined as  one “comm only u se d t o de pict  a
genus  or  t ype of p roduct ,  r a the r t han  the pa r t icu lar  product”
it se lf.14 For exam ple, the t erm  “pe r sona l computer” and  it s
acronym “PC” cannot  rece ive t rademark  p rotect ion  because tha t
t e rm describes th e spe cific t ype of produ ct. If one firm  ha d
exclus ive r igh t s to these t e rms,  a compet i tor  may be forced to
describe i t s p roduct  as  “a  machine capable of doing word
process ing an d high sp eed calculations u sing a cent ra l
p r oce s si n g u n i t , a n d  s o on . ”1 5  Beyond  its  obvious
cumber somenes s, adver tis ing of th is sor t h ind ers  economic
D :\ 1 9 9 9- 1\ F I N A L \ M K I N -F I N . W P D Ja n .  8 ,  2001
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16. S ee id .
17. S ee id .
18. Dranoff-Perlstein , 967 F .2d a t 8 57 (qu ot ing A.J . Ca nfi eld  Co. v.  Hon ickm an ,
808 F. 2d  291 , 30 4 (3d  Cir . 19 86)).
19. 15 U. S.C . § 11 14 (1 994 ).
growth  because a  longer phr ase is h ar der for a consum er t o
rem ember  and,  thus,  conveys les s in format ion  than  a  shor t ,
eas ily rem ember ed t e rm.16 As  a  r esu lt ,  consumer  sea rch
cos t s—the expenditure of time, effort,  and m oney required to
find de si red  goods or  se rvices—r ise.1 7  Gener ic terms like
“persona l comput er,” “corn flakes,” a nd  “seafood” a re  thus
denied  tr adem ar k pr otection becau se su ch  ter ms  “so dir ectly
sign ify the n a ture of t he p rodu ct  tha t  in ter es t s of com pe t it ion
dem an d t ha t ot he r p rodu cers  be a ble t o use  th em .”18
2. T ra dem ar k  in fr in gem ent u nder the Lan ham  Act
 Section  32 of the  Lanham Act  set s  for th  the b as ic defin it ion
of tr adem ar k infrin gement . The Act  p r ov ide s a  civi l ca use  of
act ion  aga ins t :
(1 ) Any  p e r son  w h o s h a ll, w it h ou t  t h e con s en t  of t h e
r e g is t r a n t —
(a ) us e in  comm er ce a ny  re pr odu ction , coun te rfeit ,
copy, o r  colorab le  im ita tion  of a r egist er ed m ar k in
conn ect ion  wit h t he  sa le, offerin g  for s al e, d ist rib u tion , or
a d ve r tis in g o f any  goods  or s er vices  on  or in  conn ect ion
w i t h wh ich  su ch u se  is lik ely t o cau se  confu sion , or t o
cau se  m ist ak e, or  to d eceiv e; or
(b) r ep rodu ce , coun te r f e i t ,  copy , o r  colorab ly  imi t a t e  a
reg i s t e red  m a r k  and  app ly  such  .  .  . t o  l abe l s , s igns ,  p r in t s ,
packages ,  wrap pe r s ,  r e c e p t a c l e s  or  a d v e r t i s em e n t s
in t en ded  to b e u se d in  com m er ce u pon  or in  conn ectio n
w i t h the  sa l e , o ffe r ing  for sa le, dis tr ibu tion , or a dve rt isin g
of good s or  se rv ices  on  or i n  con n ect ion  wit h  wh ich  su ch
use  is lik ely  to ca u se  con fu sion , or  to ca u s e  m is t a k e , o r  t o
dece ive .19
These provisions create four key requirements t hat  m ust be
sat isfied before infrin gement  can be found: registr at ion, use,
lik eli hood of confus ion , and  causa t ion. Each  of t hese  pr imary
ele men ts w ar ran t s a  br ief d iscuss ion .
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20. Id . (em ph as is a dd ed ).
21. S ee id. § 1051 (a)-(a )(1) (“The owner of a tra de-mark u sed in commerce may
apply  to r egi st er  hi s or  he r t ra de -ma r k un der th is chapter on t he principal register
established: (1) By  filin g in  th e P at en t a nd  Tr ad em ar k O ffice .  . . .”).
22. S ee supra  note 13.
23. S ee 15 U .S. C. § 1 114  (199 4).
24. S ee id. § 1051(a); Peaches Ent erta inment  Corp. v. Enterta inment  R e pe r toire
Assocs., 62 F.3d 690, 692 (5th Cir . 1995); Telemed Corp. v. Tel-Med, Inc., 588 F.2d
213, 216  (6t h C ir . 19 78).
25. S ee Holiday I n n s , I n c. v. 800 Reser vat ion, Inc., 86 F .3d 619, 626 (6th  Cir.
199 6),  cert . d eni ed , 519 U.S . 1093 (1997); Da kota  Ind us. v. D ak ota S port swea r, In c.,
946 F.2d 1384, 1388 (8th Cir. 1 991) (“In frin gem en t of a  tr ad em ar k is  a t ort  an d
requires  t he  use,  wi thou t  t he owner ’s consen t, of the  sam e or sim ilar  ma rk  in
conn ect ion  wit h t he  sa le of g oods  . . . . ”) (cita ti on s om it te d).
26. S ee 1 MCCA RT H Y, supra  note 6, § 2:8.
27. S ee 3 i d . § 23:19. Today , RE S T AT E M E N T (THIR D ) O F  UNFAIR COMPETITION  § 21
re por t er ’s note (1995) lists six “mar ket factors” based upon this ear lier list. They are:
(a)  th e degr ee of simila r ity between the respective designations,
including a com pa ri son  of
(i) th e overa ll impr ession cr eat ed by th e design at ions a s th ey ar e
used  in m ar ket ing t he r espect ive goods or ser vices or in ide nt ifying th e
Fi rs t , § 32 e xpres sly a pp lies on ly t o the u se  of a
“reproduct ion , counter feit , copy, or  color able  im it a t ion  of a
regi st ered  mark .  . .  .”20 The t e r m  “r e gis t ered” a s  u sed he re
refers  t o t rademarks  regist er ed  on t he p r in cipa l r egist er  of th e
Unit ed Sta tes P at ent  an d Tra dema rk  Office.21 This  is
sign ifica n t  because alt hou gh t ra dem ar ks  th at  ar e not  feder ally
register ed can  be  pr otect ed  unde r  § 43(a ) of the Lanham Act ,22
th ey are n ot afforded  protection as  tr adem ar ks u nder  § 32.
The second r equirem ent  is use. Tra dema rk  infringem ent ,
accordin g to the plain language of § 32, absolutely requires the
use of a  reproduct ion , count erfeit , copy, or colorable  imita t ion  of
a  mark 23 in i n te r st a t e comm erce.24 If t her e is  no use , t her e ca n
be no in fr ingement .25
Third, a likelihood of confusion mu st be shown. This is  the
key factor in finding infringem ent .2 6  The Lanham Act  does  not
define “likelih ood of confu sion,” nor does  it p rovide s pecific
guidelines  for  how it is to be shown. As  a  resu lt ,  the cour t s  have
developed a  genera l common law st anda rd b y wh ich  lik eli hood
of confu si on  is  de ter min ed . Wh et her  ther e is  a  lik eli hood of
confusion  from an  unau thor ized use of a  t r adem ark is
deter mined  based on t he pr esence or  a b se n ce of a  number  of
factors, wh ich  are ge ner a lly  ba se d u pon  a  lis t  of nin e fa ctors
ta ken  from Sect ion  731  of th e 1938 Restatement  of Torts. 27
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res pective  businesses;
(ii) the pronunciation of the designations;
(iii) th e t ra ns lat ion of a ny  fore ign  words  con tained  in  the
designations;
(iv) the verbal t ra nsla tion of an y pictur es, illust ra tions , or design s
con ta ined in the designations;
(v) the suggestions, connotations, or meanings of the designations;
(b) t he  deg ree  of  simil a r it y  in  t he  market ing  me th ods a nd  cha nn els  of
dis tr ibu tion  used for the respective goods or services;
(c) t he  cha ra cte ri st ics of t he  pr ospe ctiv e pu rch as er s of t he  goods  or
services and  the degree of care t hey a re lik ely to exer cise in m akin g
purchas ing decisions;
(d) th e de gr ee of d ist inct iven ess  of th e ot he r’s de sign at ion;
(e) wh en  th e good s, s er vice s, or b us ine ss of t he  act or d iffer  in k ind  from
those of the other, th e likelihood tha t  t h e  a cto r ’s  p rospec t ive pu rchase r s
would  exp ect  a p er son  in t he  posi tion  of th e ot h er  t o  expand  it s  market ing
or  spon sor sh ip in to t he  pr odu ct, s er vice, or  bu sin ess  ma rk et  of th e a ctor ;
(f ) wh en  th e a ctor  an d t he  oth er  sel l th eir  goods  or s er vices  or ca r ry on
th eir  bus in es se s in  diffe re nt  geog ra ph ic m ar ke ts , t he  ext en t t o wh ich  th e
o ther ’s designation is iden tified wit h t he  oth er  in t he  geogr ap hic m ar ke t of
the ac to r .
Id . Section 21 also notes tha t  o th er fa ctor s be yond  th is li st  ma y be r ele van t or
impor t an t , and t hat  a deter minat ion of likelihood of confusion should be m ade in  li gh t
of all t he fa cts a nd cir cum sta nces. See id.
28. S ee, e.g., Polar oid Corp. v. Polarad E lectronics Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d
Cir . 1961) (sett ing forth  eight  factors t o be consider ed in  the Second Cir cuit ); cf. AMF,
Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599  F.2d 341, 348-49 (9th  Cir. 1979) (set tin g forth  a sligh tly
differe n t  eight-factor test used in the Ninth Circuit). The most extensive list of
like lih ood of confus ion factors  is found in  In  re E .I. D uP ont  DeN em our s & C o., 476
F.2d 1357, 1361 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (listing thirteen factors t o be considered when
de termin ing lik eli ho od of con fus ion ).
29. 1 J E R O M E  GI L S ON  & J E F F R E Y M. SAMUELS , TRADEMARK P R O TE CT I O N  &
P RACTICE § 5.0 1[3][1 ], a t 1 5-16  & n .19  (199 6).
30. The l is t  s et  fo r th  in  AMF is represen tat ive:
1. s t r ength  of the  mark;
2. p rox imi ty of the goods;
3. s imi la r i t y of the  marks ;
4. evid en ce of act ua l confu sion ;
5. marke t ing channels used;
6. type of goods and t he degree of care likely  to  by  exerc ised by the
purchase r ;
7. de fendan t ’s in ten t  in  se lect ing the  mark ; and
8. lik elih ood of expansion of the product lines.
AMF,  599 F.2d at 348-49. The court noted that t his list is not  e xh a u s t ive , and  tha t
Alth ough  differen t Circuit s use d ifferen t var iations of the n ine
factors,28 “there is little su bsta nt ive distinction between  th e
factors us ed by th e various circuits.”29 Factors  such  as  the
s t r ength  of the register ed  mark , the  presence  of actua l
confusion , and  the int en t  of th e a lle ged  in fr in ger  a lways  form
par t of these lists.30 Lik elihood of con fusion  is gen era lly
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o ther  f ac tor s  may come  in to  play d ep en din g on  th e fa cts  an d cir cum st an ces  of a
par t i cu la r case. See id.  at 348 n .11.
31. S ee, e.g.,  Ocean Gar den, Inc. v. Markt rade Co., 953 F.2d 500, 509 (9th Cir .
1991) (“[A] find in g of a  lik eli ho od of con fus ion  [is] a factual finding . . .  .”); Cardtoons,
L.C. v. Major League Ba seball Player s Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 967 (10th Cir. 1996)
( st a t ing tha t likelihood of confusion is a ques t ion of fact); Door Sys ., Inc. v. Pr o-Line
Door  Sys ., I nc. , 83  F. 3d  169 , 17 3 (7t h C ir . 19 96) (s ta tin g th at  th e lik elih ood of
confu sion  is a  qu es ti on  of fact  wh ich  is r eve rs ibl e on ly if cl ea rl y er ro ne ou s).
32. S ee, e.g., Ch am pion s Golf Club, Inc. v. The Cham pions Golf Club, Inc., 78
F.3d 1111 , 111 6 (6t h C ir . 199 6) (“Whet he r t he re  is a  lik elih ood of conf usion is a
mixed  qu est ion of fa ct a nd  law . We a ppl y a cl ea rl y er ron eou s st an da rd  to t he  d is t r ict
cour t ’s findings  of fact  support ing the  likelihood of confusion factors, but review de
novo th e le gal  qu est ion of w he th er  th ose fou nd at iona l fact s con st itu te  a ‘like lih ood of
confusion .’” (citation omitted)); Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim  Hens on Prods., Inc., 73
F.3d 497, 502 (2d Cir. 1996) (stating that  the application of likelihood of confus ion
fact ors  is reviewed de novo, wh ile d et er mi na tion s of ea ch fa ctor  ar e fact u a l  and
distur bed only if clear ly err oneou s). 
33. The Third Circuit,  for example, has used both standards in recent actions.
Compare Versa P rods. Co. v. Bifold Co., 50 F.3d 189, 200 (3d Cir. 1995) ( sta t ing tha t
l ikelih ood of con fus ion  is a  qu es ti on  of fact ) and Dranof f-Per l s tein  Assocs.  v.  Skla r ,
967 F.2d 852, 862 (3d Cir. 1992) (consider ing  lik elih ood of confu sion  a q ue st ion of
fact ) wi th  Optician ’s Ass’n of Am. v. Ind epen dent  Optic ia ns  of Am ., 920 F.2d 187 (3d
Cir . 1990) (considering likelihood of confusion to be a mixed quest ion of fact and la w)
and Scott Pa per Co. v. Scott’s Liquid Gold, Inc., 589 F .2d 1225, 1229 n .3 (3d Cir.
1978) (cons ide ri ng  lik elih ood of confu sion  a m ixed qu est ion of fa ct a nd  law ). For  a
more comp let e di scu ssi on of t he  confu sion  over the p rope r  ev iden t ia ry  st anda rd and
s t anda rd of re vie w for  lik eli ho od of con fus ion in t h e Thir d Circu it, see  Ja quelin e
Pasquare lla , Thir d Cir cuit R eview, Trademark  La w— Con fu sion  Over  th e Li kel ih ood
of Con fusion? Dra noff-Per lste in Associa tes . v. Sk l a r (1993), 38 VILL . L. RE V. 1317
(199 3).
34. 15 U.S .C. § 11 14 (19 94); see also Holiday Inns, Inc. v. 800 Reservat ion , Inc.,
86 F.3d  619, 626 (6t h Cir . 1996), cert . d eni ed , 51 9 U .S.  109 3 (19 97).
35. S ee Fuji Ph oto Film Co. v. Shinohar a Shoji Kabus hiki Kaish a, 754 F.2d 591,
597 (5th  C ir . 1985 ) (“[E]viden ce of act ua l confu sion  [is] t he  bes t e vide nce  of like lih ood
of con fus ion .”).
re cognized as  a qu est ion of fact ,31 a lt hough  some  cour t s consider
it  a  mixed ques t ion  of la w a nd fa ct ;32 other s h ave a pp lie d b oth
stan dards at  various times.33
Fin ally,  to esta blish a t ra dema rk  infringeme n t , t here must
be causa t ion . The a lle ged  in fr in ger ’s u se  of a  “repr odu ct ion ,
count erfeit , copy, or colorab le imi tat ion” of a mar k must
actua l ly be  “likely  to cause  confusion , or  t o cause mist ake,  or  t o
deceive.”34 Actua l confusion , t hough  pow er fu l ev iden ce, n eed n ot
be shown.35 As previously discussed, each  of t hese  fou r  p r imary
s t a tu tory ele men ts—r egi st ra t ion , u se , likeli hood of con fusion ,
and causation—must  be shown  to e st ab li sh  a  t r ademark
in fr in gem en t  unde r  § 32 of the Lanham Act .
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36. S ee 1 MCCA RT H Y, supra no te 6, § 7:15 (“One or  more  nu mber s, alone  or in
combina tion  w it h  other symbols, can function as a mark to identify and distinguish
the pr odu cts  of one s elle r.”); see also id.  a t  n.1 (citing c ases  from 1872 to  1986 tha t
held  pu re  nu mb er s p ro te cta ble  as  tr ad em ar ks ).
37. S ee, e.g., Humph reys Homeopath ic Med. Co. v. Hilton, 60 F. 756, 758
(C.C.S .D.N .Y. 1894) (refusing to ext e n d tra demar k protection to a series of number s
assigned  to me dicines because  th ey we re  me re ly u sed  in a  ser ies  to d ist ing uis h on e
product  f rom anothe r ).  But see Lawren ce Mfg. Co. v. Lowell Hosiery Mills, 129 Mass.
325, 327 (1 880) (h oldin g th at  th e n um ber  “523” for hosiery could serve as a
t rademark) .
38. S ee, e.g., Int el Corp . v. Advan ced Micro De vices, In c., 756 F. S upp . 1292,
1295-98 (N.D . Ca l. 199 1) (hol din g th e n um ber -ma rk  “386” for a  pa rt icul ar  typ e of
mi crop roce ssor  to b e ge ne ri c).
39. S ee, e.g., In re Arm co Steel Corp., 127 U.S.P.Q. 135, 136-37 (T.T.A.B. 1960)
(denying tr ad em ar k p rot ect ion t o “17-4PH” and  “17-7PH” as  des igna t ions  of  grades
of stainless steel products even though these products had  no t  been  a ss igned  numbers
by th e Amer ican I ron  an d St eel In stit ut e, and n o  manufac tu re r  othe r  t han  the
app li can t  ha d u se d t he se  sp ecific n um bers), rev’d su b n om . Armco Ste el Corp. v.
Wat son , 188  F.  Su pp . 55 4 (D. D.C . 19 60).
40. S ee Ea stm an  Kodak  Co. v. Bell & Howe ll Docum ent  Pr ods. Co., 994 F .2d
1569, 157 0-71  (Fe d. C ir . 19 93).
41. S ee Arrow Fas tener  Co. v. Stan ley Works, 59 F.3d 384, 393  (2d C ir . 19 95).
42. In  his exhaust ive tr ea tis e on  tr ad em ar k la w, for  exa mp le, P rofe ssor
McCar thy does not address t he tr adema rk eligibility of phone numbers a s  such ,  bu t
only discus ses t eleph one m nem onics. S ee 1 MCCA RT H Y, supra  note 6, § 7:13.
43. 88 P.  26 (U ta h 1 906 ).
B. Protection of Telephone Nu m bers and M arks
1. Telephone num bers
 Numbers as  such  ca n  r e ce iv e t r ad ema rk  pr otection  if th ey
ser ve to iden t ify  or  d is t ingu ish  the good s of on e ve ndor .36 For
examp le, serial numbers are a fforded pr ot ect ion  only i f som e
inheren t d is t in ct iveness  can  be shown.37 However , if t he
nu mber  is u sed  in a  gene ric fas hion , it  can never qualify as a
t rademark.38 Likewise, grade or qu a lity m arks  a re not
pr otecta ble if they ar e used s olely to indicate size or  q u a li ty.39
Nevertheless, nu mer ical tra dema rk s ar e presu med r egistra ble
without  pr oof of seconda ry m ea nin g,40 and  when  cha llenged in
t r ademark infringemen t litigat ion, the bu rd en  of provin g th e
absen ce of secondar y mean ing falls upon t he cha llenger.41
These sa me p r in cip les  sh ould  hold  t rue for  t ele ph one
num bers, th ough t his  ar ea of th e law  is not  en t ire ly  clea r .42 The
first  case d ealin g with t elephone  numbers  as  t r ademarks  was
R ocky Mou nt ain  Bell T elephon e Co. v.  Utah  Independen t
Telephone Co.43 In  Rocky Mountain  Bell, two compet ing
tele ph one compa nies opera ting in S alt La ke City, Ut ah , used
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44. S ee id . at 27-28.
45. S ee id . at 27.
46. S ee id . at 29-30.
47. S ee id . (“If appellant ma y prevent t he use of one nu m ber  in  connect ion  with
a  cer ta in t ele ph one  up on t he  gr oun d of pr ior u se and inconven ience, wh y not of all
used  by respondent when inconvenience results? .  . .  But inconvenience may also
arise where pa t ron s of each  sys te m h ave  th e sa me  nu mb er , an d ye t it  is n ot
pra cticable  to p re ven t a  du pli cat ion  of th es e n um ber s.”).
48. S ee id . at 29 (“There is no claim in this case th at t he nu mber 888, either
alone, or as  used  in conn ection wit h t he t eleph one conn ected wit h a p p el la n t ’s Trou ble
Dep a r t m e n t, is, or const itu tes, a  tr ade-m ar k. Nor  could th is claim p reva il, if
made  . . . . ”).
49. No. 83 C iv. 3 424 , 19 83 U .S.  Dis t.  LE XIS  145 73 (N .D.  Ill . Au g. 1 6, 1 983 ).
the number  “888” to reach  a  “Tr ouble  Depa r tmen t” or “Trou ble
Clerk .”4 4  Upon the first compan y’s suit to enjoin the other’s use
of th e n u m ber , t he t r ia l cou r t  su st a in ed  the d efenda nt ’s m ot ion
to dism iss for  fa ilu re t o st a te a  cause  of act ion .45 On appea l , the
Utah Supreme Court affirmed, holding that  neither compan y
could p reven t  t he othe r  from u s in g th e nu mbe r for t his
pur pose.46 Focus ing on  the  impract ica lity of requ irin g
compet ing telephone compan ies to use only unique numbers,47
the cour t  concluded tha t  the telephone n um ber “888,” whet her
used  alone or in connection with t he compan y’s Trou ble
Depar tmen t , could not  rece ive  t r ade mark pr otect ion .48 This
case ess en t ia lly  st ands  for  the p ropos it ion  tha t  a  t ele ph one
nu mber  as s uch  cannot  be  pr otect ed  because numbers mu st
remain  in  the  pub lic domain .
More recen tly, h owever, in  Chicago World’s Fair-1992 Corp.
v. 1992 Chicago World’s Fair Com m ission ,49 a feder al d ist rict
cour t  aw ar ded  a p re limin ar y inju nct ion pr even t ing  the
defendant  from us ing a  number  simil a r t o t he  pl ant i ff’s. This
un publish ed de cis ion  appears  to be the  fi r st  to g ran t t r ademark
r igh t s in  a  t ele ph one nu mber  it se lf. S t ill , given  the n a ture of
t elephone nu mb er s, Chicago World’s Fair i s p robably the
exce pt ion  ra th er t ha n t he r ule . Mos t  t elephone  numbers  a re
un likely to be  dist in ct ive  en ough  to mer it  pr otect ion  as
num bers.
2. Telephone mnem onics
 M n em onics , however ,  a re another  mat ter .  Al though van i ty
number s a r e relat ively new t o tra dema rk  law, it is clear t ha t
t ele ph one mnemonics  can  receive t ra dem ar k pr otection  in  some
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50. S ee, e.g., Dial-A-Mat tr ess F ra nch ise Cor p. v. Pa ge, 880 F.2d 675  (2d  Ci r .
198 9); see also infra  note 55.
51. 208 Ca l. R pt r.  412  (Ct . App . 19 84).
52. S ee id . at 414.
53. S ee id .
54. Id . at 416.
55. S ee, e.g., Dial-A-Mattress, 880 F.2d at 675; American  Airlines, Inc. v. A 1-
800 -A-M-E -R-I-C -A-N Cor p.,  622  F.  Su pp . 67 3 (N .D.  Ill . 19 85).
56. S ee, e.g., Dra noff-Per lste in Assocs. v. S kla r, 967  F.2d  852 (3d Cir . 1992 ); see
also infra  Par t II.B.3.
57. S ee, e.g., Dial-A-Mattress, 880  F.2 d a t 6 78; see also infra  Par t II.B.3.
circumstan ces.50 The first  reported case in which a court  had to
consider  a  t rademark for  a  tele ph one m nem onic was  decided in
1984. In  Cytanovich Reading Center v. Reading Game,51 t he
pla int iff opera ted a  reading im pr ovem en t  cen ter  in  Pa lo Alt o,
Californ ia.  Since 1975, Cyt a n ovich  had e xclu sive r igh t s t o the
loca l teleph one nu mber  321-7323, cor responding  to the
mn emon ic “321-READ,” and ha d adver t ised  the m nem onic for
m a n y years.52 The  defen da nt s a lso opera ted  a r ead ing
impr ovement  ser vice, an d in 1980,  opened a  b ranch  near  the
pla int iff’s center . The de fen da nt  obt a in ed  the t ele ph one
nu mber  494-7323, corresponding to th e mn emonic “494-
READ.”53 On p lain tiff ’s  cl a im of common  law t r ademar k
infringem ent , the California Court  of Appeals ruled that
neith er  pa rt y’s ph one n um ber s or m nem onics wer e pr otecta ble
as tr adem ar ks or ser vice ma rk s. The cour t ’s  p r imary  reason ing
was that  “[d]ue to the common use of the word ‘read’ in
vir tua l ly a ll con text s .  . . n eit her  the n umber  it se lf n or  s u ffix
method .  .  . can  be deemed  to cons t it u t e  a  t r ademark  or  s erv ice
mark.”54 In other words, t h e  cou r t constr ued “read” to be a
generic ter m.
S ince th is  case , cou r t s h ave b ecom e m ore fam iliar  with
mn emon ic nu mbe rs , an d h ave r egula rly  up he ld t he ir va lidit y as
tra demark s.55 Still, the t heories a nd a ppr oaches to enforcement
vary cons ider ably . F or  exa mple, s ome cou r t s n ow r efu se t o
gran t any protection whatsoever to mnemonics that  include
gener ic t e rms.5 6  Ot he rs  re as on t ha t a  nu mb er  incorp ora tin g a
gener ic t e rm may be d is t inct  enou gh , sometimes  solely by
v ir tue of it s incorpor a t ion  in t o a  t e lephone  number .57 This
d iscrepancy may be  exp la in ed  in  pa r t  by t he n a ture of
tele ph one mnemonics  compared to the  purpose  of t r ademarks.
Trademarks  a re  prot ect ed  on ly insofar  as t hey ser ve to
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58. S ee Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Caban a, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 779-80 (1992)
(Stevens, J., concu rr ing).
59. S ee N icholas S . Economide s, The  Economics o f Trademarks, 78 TRADEMARK
RE P . 523,  527 (1 988) (“By t he  begi nn ing  of t he  twen t i eth  cen tu ry t r ademarks  were
un der st ood not t o be usefu l in iden tifying t he sou rce, bu t r at her  as ide nt ifying a
qua li t y st an da rd .”).
60. J . Micha el Mona ha n, Com men t, Wait ing b y  t h e Phone: Why  Telephone
N u m ber Mn em oni cs Wa rra nt  Tr ad em ark  Prot ection , 58 LA. L. RE V. 281 , 28 6 (19 97).
61. S ee id . at 286-87.
62. S ee supra  note 54.
63. 880 F. 2d  675  (2d C ir . 19 89).
des igna te  source, origin, or a ffiliation of goods or ser vices.58
Some a rgue tha t  t r ademarks rea lly on ly serve to indica te  the
qua li t y of goods or ser vices.59 Rega rdles s of w hich  exp la na t ion
is accept ed, h owever , mn e m onic t ele ph one n umbers d o not
alw ays  serve these purposes. While they may serve as “a  clever
label for a p hon e ser vice,”60 an d t her eby iden tify th e source of
tha t  service, frequent ly they ar e simply a catchy way t o h elp
cus tomers remember  a  number  for  a  company tha t  does  not
have phone sales or phone services as the focus of its business.61
In  su ch  a  case , wh et her  the m nem onic actua lly serves  to
des igna te  the origin  or affiliation of goods or services is unclear.
3. Generic telephone mn emonics
a. The split in the courts. The  que st ion of wha t, if any ,
protection sh ould be extended to mnemonic num bers, includ ing
those wit h  gen er ic t er ms,  is  one of t he m ost  t rouble som e
ques t ions su r round ing t r ademark p rotect ion  of t e lephone
mnemonics. There  is  cu r ren t ly  a split in t he Un ited St at es
Circu it  Cour ts of Appeals on this issue, but the forces against
g ran t ing pr otect ion t o gener ic mn em onics a ppe ar  to h ave  t he
upper ha nd.
This  split  began  in t h e  la t e 1980s. In Cytanovich,  t he
Californ ia  Cour t  of Appea l s s et  the s t age  by  concluding tha t  a
gener ic t e rm cannot  be p rotect ed a s  pa r t  of a  t e lephone
mn emon ic.62 However ,  in  Dial-A-Mattress Franchise Corp. v.
Page,63 th e  Se con d Circu i t  held tha t  a  gener ic t e rm in  a
tele ph one mnem onic could be protected. In Dial-A-Mattress,
two mat tress reta ilers who took orders by phone disputed th e
ot her’s use of nearly identical mnemonic telephone num bers.
The p la in t iff had  used  the loca l  phone  number  cor responding to
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64. Sin ce telep hone  nu mber s consist  of only seven  d ig it s , t he  la s t  “s” in  the
e igh t l e t t er  word  “mat t ress” was d r opped by p lain tiff in it s ad vert ising. Act ua lly, as
the cour t  noted , “[ a] lt hough  the  word ‘ma t t r ess’ has one l et t e r  more  than  the
t e lephone nu mb er , dia lin g t he  ext ra  let te r d oes  not  affe ct com plet ion of th e call.” Id .
a t  677.
65. S ee id . at 678.
66. The general rationale behind this policy was that t he a ddition of the “800”
or  othe r pr efix mak es th e ma rk  sufficiently d istin ctive to m erit  prot ection . See id.
While  the n umber s “800” or “888” can be considered generic terms (or perh aps even
funct iona l eleme nt s), a ma rk  composed of gener ic part s ma y be su fficient ly distin ctive
to merit protection because marks  are evaluat ed as a whole, rather  than  in par ts . S ee
2 MCCA RT H Y, supra  not e 6, § 1 2.1 2[3].  Fo r e xa mp le,  th e t ra de ma rk s V-8 ® for
vegeta ble juice a nd A.1 ® for  s teak  sauce ar e com pos ed o f pu re ly ge ne ri c pa rt s. S uch
marks  a re often r eferred to as composite mark s. These marks are protected because
the gene ric pa rt s ar e joined  in a  way t ha t is d istin ctive. S ee i d .; see a lso 1
MCCA RT H Y, supra  note 6, § 7:15.
This  justification is more difficult to ma ke in th e case of telephone nu mber s
because “800” i s  essen t ia lly a p re scr ibed  te rm  th at  inv olves  no ch oice or  cre at ivit y on
the part of the toll-free number’s owner. In l i gh t  o f e s t ablished  tr adem ar k law , it
s e em s absurd to suggest th at  th e simp le add ition of “800” could ren der a  gener ic
t e lephone mnemonic distinctive. For example, misspellings or  p h on etic e qu iva len ts  of
a  p r otecte d ma rk  ar e not  recognized a s bein g different  th an  th e prot ected wor d itse lf.
S ee Hen ri’s Food Pr ods. Co. v. Ta sty S na cks, In c., 817 F.2d 1 303, 1305-07 (7th  Cir.
198 7).  If, for example, t he m nem onic 800-SEAFOOD were g ran ted  t r ademark
pr ote ction  for a  comp an y se llin g se afood  pr odu cts , va ri at ion s of t h e clear ly gener ic
wor d “seafood” would be cons idere d to be in fring e m e n t  i f used  in  a  mnemonic , and
a  competitor could not ad vertise sea food products u sing 800-44C-FOOD, or  888-
SEAFOOD. Under  the m isspelling and phonetics doctrines , in fr ingem ent  would su rely
be found in both of these cases.
67. S ee, e.g., Anth ony L. F letch er & D avid J . Ker a, Th e Fort y-T hi rd  Yea r of
Ad m in ist rat ion  of the Lanh am  Trad emark  Act of 1946, 80 TRADEMARK RE P . 591, 676
(1990) ( “[ I] t i s r a the r  di ff icu lt  t o unde r st and  why  t r ademark  law  shou ld protect
MATTRES,6 4  628-8737, in th e New York  met ropolitan a rea
s in ce 1976. In 1983, the defendant  star ted a similar business,
and su cceed ed  in  obt a in in g t he n a t ion wid e t oll-free n um ber
cor responding to 1-800-MATTRE SS. I n cons ider ing t he
pla int iff’s t r ademark  and unfa ir  compe t it ion  cla im s,  the Secon d
Circu it  he ld  tha t  even  though  the term  “mat tress” was a
gener ic te rm , mn em onics wer e exem pted  from the  genera l
pol icy lim it in g protect ion  for  th e use of a  gener i c t e rm.65
Accordin gly, the  cour t  g ran ted  t rademark  p rotect ion  to the
pla int iff’s m nem onic.
The Dial-A-Mattress decision ha d t he e ffect of pr otectin g
gener ic ter ms, a nd t he P at en t  and Tr adem ar k Office (PTO)
responded by the rea ft e r  gran t ing t r ademark  r eg is t r a t ion  to
mn emon ics which included generic terms. 66 Th is  de cis ion
pr ompt ed wid esp re ad  crit icism fr om t he  legal com mu nit y.67
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[gen er ic] ter ms .”); Terr y Ann S mit h, Telephone Num bers That Sp ell Generic Terms:
A Protectable Trademark  or an Invi ta t ion t o Mon opoli ze a  Ma rk et?, 28 U.S .F.  L. RE V.
1079, 1112 (1994) (noting t ha t in  Dial-A-Mattress “[t]he S econd Circu it . . . ult ima tely
ignored th e p ri nci ple s of ge ne ri c te rm s”).
68. Dra noff-Perlst ein  Ass ocs.  v. S kl ar , 96 7 F .2d  852 , 85 7 (3d  Cir . 19 92).
69. S ee id . at 853-54.
70. S ee id . at 854.
71. Id . at 857.
72. S ee id . at 859-60. Because gen er icne ss oft en  hin ges  on t he  ava ila bilit y of
commonly  used  a lte rna tives,  t he Dranoff cour t a lso r ea son ed t ha t s ince  te lep hon e
numbers consist only of an area  code and seven digits, th e ra nge of alt ern at ives is
limited. S ee i d . at  859. Wher e toll-fre e n um ber s a re  conce rn ed,  th e r an ge of
alter nat ives is fu rt he r li mi te d be cau se com pet itor s a re  cons tr ain ed t o us e on e of on ly
two prefixes: either “800” or “888.” Thu s in the f ield of tele phon e mn emon ics, a
protected gener ic term  is even  more  limitin g on compet itors  th an  it would be in other
context s because of the increased limitations in available alternatives.
73. S ee Lan des & P osner , supra  no te  15,  at  273  (“Th e a va ila bil it y of a lter na tive
words, symbols, and so on to those appropriated for use as particular t rade ma rk s . . .
is a precondition to a system  of tra demar ks th at is effective in lowering consum er
sea rch  cost s.”); see also id.  at 276 (“[I]f one firm is given exclusive rights t o  wo r ds
tha t  define or d escribe a  produ ct, th is will red uce th e produ ctivity of th e  t rademarks
of oth er  fir ms  th at  ma ke  th e s am e p ro du ct. ”).
More recen tly, in  Dranoff-Perlstein Associates v. Sklar ,  t he
Th ird Circu it r efuse d t o adopt  th e Second Cir cuit ’s r eas oning in
Dial-A-Mattress.68 In t he Dranoff-Perlstein case , t he cou r t
consider ed the common law tradem ark claims of two pe rson a l
in ju ry law firm s in  th e Dela war e valley. On e firm  began  us ing
the phone nu mbe r a nd  corres pond ing m nem onic “INJ URY-1” in
1984 an d a dver tis ed it  exte ns ively.69 I n  1990, a not her  firm
obtained  the nu mber correspon d in g to “INJURY-9” and  began
adver t is ing it. 70 In  de clin in g t o ext en d t rade mark pr otect ion  to
the fi r st  fi rm’s  use of t he  word  “in ju ry, ” t he  cour t  noted tha t  if
t r ademark p rot ection is  exten ded t o mn emon ics us ing gen eric
terms,  “the  fi r st  fi r m  in  a  given  market  to ob ta in  such  a
tele ph one number  would , mer ely  by w in nin g t he r ace t o the
t e lephone company,  ga in  an  unfa i r  advan tage  over  it s
competitors.”71 This un fair ad vant age would ma nifest its elf by
a l lowing a  firm  to exclu de a ll compet itor s from  us ing t he
protected  gener ic term in  mn emonics of th eir own, an d th ereby
thwar t th e funda men ta l policy of the gener icness doctrine. 72
The bas ic economic p r incipl es  of supp ly  and  demand u rge  a
regu latory fr amework  tha t  preven t s one  compet i tor  from
deple tin g the  supp ly  of a  fin i te commodit y—words in  th is
case.73
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74. S ee Sou th wes te rn  Bell  Yellow P a ges, Inc. v. Wilkins, 920 S.W.2d 544, 549
(Mo. Ct. App. 1996) (holding tha t th e mar k “772-ROOF ” i s  gener ic  as a  m a r k for  a
ro ofin g con t r acto r ).
75. S ee, e.g., Fisons Hort icultur e, Inc. v. Vigoro Indus., 30 F.3d 466, 472 (3d Cir.
199 4); Gua rdia n Life I ns. C o. v. Ame rican Guardian  Life Assurance Co., 943 F. Supp.
509, 520 (E.D. Pa. 1996); First Key st on e  F ed. Sav. Bank v. First  Keystone Mortgage,
Inc.,  923  F.  Su pp . 69 3, 7 04 (E .D.  Pa . 19 96).
76. S ee Johnson  v . Automot ive  Ven tu res,  Inc., 890 F . Su pp . 50 7, 5 15 (W .D.  Va.
199 5); KAT Video Prods., Inc. v. KKCT-FM Radio, 560 N.W.2d 203, 209 (N.D. 1997)
(following Dranoff-Perlstein’s ruling th at gener ic marks r eceive n o t r ademark
pr ote cti on ).
77. S ee Express Mortga ge Brokers , Inc. v . Simpson Mortga ge, Inc., 31
U.S.P.Q.2d 137 1 (E .D.  Mich . 19 94).
78. S ee id .  a t  1371.  The  su it  was  descr ibed  as  a  t r a d e m a rk infr ingem ent  suit
b rough t un der  15 U .S.C . § 1 1 25 (a ), which is § 43(a) of the Lanh am Act. Ther e was
no indication that  any of the “mar ks” involved wer e regis ter ed, leavin g an  un fair
comp et iti on  c la im the on ly  ava i lab le  a lt e rna t ive unde r  t he  Lanham Act .
79. S ee id . at  1372 -73 (cit ing  Dr an off-Per lst ein  Assocs. v. Skla r, 967 F.2d 852,
858 (3d Cir. 1992)). The Expr ess Mortgage  court also questioned th e Dranoff-Perlstein
cour t ’s ina bilit y to im agin e al ter na tive  mn em onics for  per sona l inju ry law yer s: “The
cour t  won der s wh et he r t he  Th ir d Ci rcu it  cons ide re d s uch  possib ilities as 1-800-
AMBULANCE, 1-80 0-J ACKP OT , or  1-80 0-LO TT ER Y give n t he  con te xt  of th e business
addressed  in  Dranoff-Perlstein .” Id . at 1373 n .3.
80. Id . at  1373 -74 (“[D]efen da nt s cou ld h ave  chos en  to u se s uch  te lep hon e
numbers as 1 -80 0-M OR TG AGE , 1-80 0-L OAN -YES,  1-800 -MON EY-1, or  an y o f ano the r
half-dozen cho ices .”).
Since Dranoff-Perlstein, th e Miss ou r i Cour t of Appea ls,74 a s
well as  oth er cour ts  with in t he T hir d Cir cuit ,75 ha ve followed
the Thir d Cir cuit ’s r ea sonin g. Dranoff-Perlstein ha s  a lso been
cited favora bly in federa l and  sta te court s in oth er
jurisdictions.76
However , a t  lea st  one  cour t  fr om  the  Sixth  Circu i t  has
refused  to follow the lead of Dranoff-Perlstein.77 In  Express
Mort gage Brokers, Inc. v. Sim pson  M ortgage, In c, a  mor tgage
broker  w ith  the number  “1 -800-76 0-CASH” sough t  a
p rel imina ry in junct ion  a gain st  an oth er  compet ing m ort gage
broker  i n the  same  a rea  with  th e nu mb er  “369-CASH .”78 In
gran t ing an  in junct ion ,  the federa l d is t r ict  cou r t  for  t he  Eas t ern
Dist r ict  of Michigan distinguished Dranoff-Perlstein, re a son ing
t ha t  in Dranoff-Perlstein, t he “IN J URY-1” m ark wa s fou nd t o
be generic beca u s e t here  was  a la ck of comm only ava ilable
alter na tives for oth er s imilar businesses to use for th e same
services.79 Conver sely, in Express Mort gage, t he  cour t  found  the
pla int iff’s ma rk  descriptive, noting t her e were “a  plethora  of
alter na tives to p la int iff’s  u se of CASH in rela tion to mort gage-
related services”80
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81. S ee Mona ha n, supra  n o t e 60, at  291 (“1-800-FLOWE RS ind icates  not on ly
t h e p r od u ct , flower s, bu t a lso t he  ser vice, a  na tion wide  ne tw ork  ta kin g ord er s for  an d
de live r ing flowers. ‘FLOWE RS,’ i n  t h a t  scen ar io, sig nifi es m ore  th an  jus t flor al
ar ra ng em en ts .”).
82. S ee Smit h, supra  note 67, at  1110-12.
83. S ee, e.g., Elizabeth A. Horky, Note, 1-800 -I-AM -VA IN : Sh oul d T eleph one
M n em oni cs be Protected as Trad emarks?, 3 J.  INTELL . P ROP . L. 213, 252 (1995)
( sugges t ing th at  telep hone  mn emon ics shou ld b e  pr esumed descr ip t ive , l ike
alph an um eric ma rk s, a nd  sh ould  re ceive  pr ote ction  only  up on a  showin g of a ctu al
fun ction  as  a  t rademark).
84. S ee Mona ha n, supra  note 60, at  307.
85. U.S. DE P T . O F  CO M M E RC E , TRADEMARK MA N U AL  O F  E XAMINING P ROCEDURE
§ 1209.01(b)(12) (2d ed., Rev. 1 , 1997). 
Express Mort gage not wit hs ta nd ing, Dranoff-Perlstein is the
bett er-rea soned case. A gener ic t er m use d in  a  t ele ph one
mn emon ic is  st ill  gen er ic a nd  s h ou ld be den ied  t rademark
protect ion . Some commentat ors have reasoned t ha t  t e lephone
mn emon ics in corpor a t in g gener ic t e r m s should be pr otected
because  they indica te n ot  only t he s in gle  pr odu ct  or  ser vice
designa ted  by the gen eric term , but  also other services involved,
such  as a na tionwide network of taking order s for  and
deliver ing the  product .81 However, this reasoning is unsound;
the same cou ld be a rgued ab out  nea rly a ny comp an y us ing a
mn emon ic te leph one n um ber , beca use the  repu ta t ion  of the
company an d it s a ssociat ed se rvices a re a lways  boun d u p wit h
its  rela ted  ad vert isin g ter ms . The m nem onic teleph one nu mber
is always one of these terms.
At  th e oth er e xtr eme , some comm ent at ors, in  react ion to
Dial-A-Mattress, have called for an amendm e n t  of the  Lanham
Act  to ma ke clear  th at  th e gene ricn ess d octrin e ap plies t o all
t rademarks regard less of their  form.82 O thers  a rgue  tha t
t ele ph one mn em onics ough t  t o be requ i red  to meet  a  s t andard
of dist in ct ivenes s h igh er  than  tha t  by w hich  other  types  of
marks  ar e evalua ted before tr adem ar k  protection is granted. 83
St ill othe r s a rgue  that  mnemonic m ark s should be pr otected
only against other m nemonic mar ks.84
b. The PTO response. In  1994, in  re spon se t o th e sp lit, t he
PTO issu ed n ew a dm inis tr at ive guide lines , ad optin g the
Dranoff-Perlstein r eason ing. Under th ese new guidelines,
t r ademark exam iner s a re in st ructed  tha t  “[t]h e fa ct  tha t  a
de sign a t ion  is  in  the for m of a t e lephone  number  is  insuffi cien t ,
by itself, to render  it d istin ctive.”85 Examining a t torneys  a re
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86. Id .
87. S ee Dr an off-Per lst ein  Ass ocs.  v. S kl ar , 96 7 F .2d  852 , 85 7 (3d  Cir . 19 92).
88. S ee i d .; 2 MCCA RT H Y, supra  no te  6, § 1 2.0 1[2].
89. The “1-800-F LOWERS ®” mark, for example, is still a valid registered
t rademark, th ough  it is a rgu ably ge ner ic. S ee Principal Register, United States  Pa ten t
and Tr ad em ar k O ffice, R egis tr at ion  No.  1,00 9,7 17.  Th e good s a nd  se rv ices  for w hi ch
th is mar k is registered are described as “[r]eceiving and placing orders for flowers
and flor a l p rod uct s.” Id . “Flowers” is arguably the gener ic term for this service.
90. 838 F.  Su pp . 12 47 (E .D.  Te nn . 19 93) [h er e in a ft er  Holiday Inns I ], rev’d , 86
F.3d 619 (6th  Cir. 19 96) [her eina fter , Holiday Inns II ], cert. d eni ed , 519 U.S. 1093
(199 7).
instructed to refuse regis tr at ion if an  ap plicat ion is made for  “a
de sign a t ion  which consists of a mer ely descript ive or gen eric
t e rm with  numera ls  in  t he  form of a  t e lephone  number .”86
These new P TO guidelines sh ould adequ at ely ensur e th at  th e
mist ak es of Dial -A-Mat tr ess ar e not repea ted. As sta ted a bove,
generic ter ms s hould n ot be protected becau se protectin g them
would  re st ra in comp et itor s from  effectively descr ibing t heir
products.87 Becau se t his  is pla in ly con t ra ry  to estab li shed
t r ademark law,88 gen er ic t ele ph one mnemonics  shou ld not
re ceive p rotect ion  as tr adem ar ks u nder  th e Lan ha m Act. But
the ju ry is  st ill  out  on  t h is pr ecise qu est ion. Given  th e split
between  the  Second  and Thir d Cir cuit s, in  spite of the n ew PTO
guidelines, gener ic mn emon ics persist  in th e ma rk et a nd will be
ar ound for some tim e to come. 89
III. COM PL E ME NT ARY TE L E P H O N E  MN E M O N I C S : H O L ID A Y  IN N S ,
IN C . V . 800-R E S E R V A T I O N , IN C .
 In  spite of th eir notoriet y, consum ers frequ en t ly mis dia l
van i ty numbers b y subs t it u t in g a  zer o for  the le t t er  “O,” or
subs t i tu t ing th e nu mbe r on e for th e let ter  “I.” For exam ple, if
a t t empt ing to dial t he n um ber 800-POP CORN (800 -767 -267 6),
a  poten t i a l cus tomer  might  mis t aken ly d ia l  t he  number
corr esponding to 800-P 0PC 0RN (800-707-2076 ), with  zeros in
p lace of th e digit 6 wh ich  cor responds  to the  le t t er  “O.” Th is
mista ken  num ber is  a comp leme nt ar y nu mbe r. Th is
phenomenon is wide ly kn own by bu sin esse s wit h t oll-free
ser vice. It is  also well k nown  by th eir  compet itor s, pr oviding a n
environm ent  ripe for one of th e most r ecent significant cas es
involving complementar y mnemonics: Holiday Inn s, Inc. v. 800-
Reservat ion ,  Inc.90
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91. It  is also worth noting that th is mark is probably not generic because
Holiday Inn s is not  selling h olidays, bu t is se lling accomm odat ion an d dini n g services
for  which “HOLIDAY” is not the gen eric term.
92. S ee Holiday Inns II , 86 F.3d at 620.
93. Id . at 621.
94. S ee Holiday Inns I , 838 F. Supp. at  1255.
95. S ee id .
96. S ee id . at 1254.
Holida y Inns , Inc.  owned  the r i ght s to th e nu mber  1-800-
465-4329, corr esponding t o the van ity nu mber  1-800-
HOLIDAY, for  its  na tionwide res ervat ion service. The
mn emon ic was  not  a  regis tered t rademark,91 bu t  Hol iday Inns
had own ed  and u se d t he cor res pon ding t oll-fr ee  number  for
many years . Moreover, th e mn emon i c ap pea red  in “virt ua lly
all” of the cor por a t ion ’s $ 20  mill ion  to $30 m ill ion  annua l
me dia , pr int , an d r ad io adve rt isin g.92
In  1993, businessman Albert Montreuil discovered t ha t
numbers complem en t in g 1-8 00-HOLID AY ha d n ot  been
reserved. Wit h  the a dm it t ed  pu rpos e of in ter cep t in g ca lls  from
misd ia l ing Holida y Inns customers, Montreuil obtained the
r igh t s to these  complementa ry  numbers  and began  a  hote l
reserva t ions service which could make reservations at Holiday
Inns an d oth er n at iona l hote l ch a ins . Mont reu il  confessed tha t
h i s new compa ny, 800-Rese rva t ion , “re ape d b en efit s in  di rect
pr oport ion to Holiday Inn s’s efforts a t m ar ket ing 1-800-
HO LIDAY for secu rin g res er vat ions.”93
At  t r ia l , t he  Di st r ict  Cour t  for  t he  Eas t ern  Dis t r ict  of
Tenn essee foun d in  favor  of Holiday Inns and gra nted a
p rel imina ry injunct ion  aga ins t  800-Reserva t ion .94 The cour t
concluded tha t  a lt hough  800-Res er va t ion  could  res er ve r ooms
for  cus tomers a t  Hol iday Inns hote ls,  Holiday Inn s wa s st ill
dam aged because t he defenda nt  used a  differen t comput er
system  which  might  sh ow  n o vacancies  a t  a  pa r t icu la r  Hol iday
Inn wh en  rooms w er e in  fact  ava ila ble , a nd a lso because a
cus tomer would be more likely to obta i n  a  favor able  room ra te
from Holida y In ns  dir ectly. 95  Whi le r ecognizin g th at  th e
defendan t  d id  not  cause th e confus ion  tha t  causes  misd ia l ing ,96
the d is t r ict  cour t  conclude d t ha t t he d efend an ts  wer e us ing
Holida y Inn s’ ma rk  in an  insidious an d par asit ic mann er s o as
to ca tch  unsuspect ing consumers. “F rom the  consumer ’s
s t andpoin t, defendan ts ’ use is  ins idious b ecau se, wh ile
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97. Id . at 1255.
98. Holiday Inns II , 86 F.3d at 626.
99. S ee id. at  62 5.  Althou gh  the m ark “1-80 0-HOL IDAY” wa s not a r egistered
mark, the co u r t  ag r ee d th at  it wa s pr otecta ble un der t he La nh am  Act, largely
because th e defen dan ts con ceded t ha t it  was . See id.  at 624.
100. S ee id . at  623-2 4; cf. Ho li d ay Inns I , 838  F.  Su pp . a t 1 255  (“In fa ct,
de fendan t s en ga ge i n n o m ea ni ng ful  ad ver ti sin g wh at soe ver .”).
101. S ee Holiday Inns II , 86 F.3d at 625.
102. Id . at 626.
103. Id .
104. S ee id . A petition for writ of certiorar i in this case wa s  den ied  by the
S u p re m e Cour t .  S ee 519 U.S . 1093 (1997). H owever , as bind ing  case  law  in  the  S ix th
Circu it , Holiday Inns II  has been  followed in at  least one other  factually similar case,
U-Haul In t’l., In c. v.  Kr esch , 943 F. Su pp. 802 (E.D. Mich 1 996 ), and wa s discussed
in  a se cond fact ua lly dissim ilar  case, S ports A uth ority, In c. v. Ab ercrom bie & F it ch ,
Inc., 965  F.  Su pp . 92 5 (E .D.  Mich . 19 97).
defendan t s have not  crea ted  the confus ion  inheren t  in  the use
of van ity n um ber s, t he y ha ve clever ly sp r ea d the ir  ne t  to
cap tu re th e consu mer  at  th e ver y momen t h is confusion  is
ma nifes te d bu t n ot n ecess ar ily ap pa re nt .”97
Upon review, th e Sixth  Cir cuit reversed.98 In  ana lyzing
Holida y In ns ’ tr ad ema rk  infr ingem ent  claim,  t he court  noted
tha t  the Lanh am Act’s thr eshold requ irem ent  of use was  not
s a t isfied.99 The defenda nt  ha d never  adver tised or u sed “1-800-
HOLIDAY” or  any copy or  facsimile of any of Holida y In ns ’
mar ks. In  fact ,  800-Reserva t i on  h a d engaged in almost no
adver t is ing a t  a l l and had only adver tised it s toll-free n um ber
as a  n u mber , n ot  in  it s m nem onic for m.100 The  court  of appea ls
re jected  the  di st r i ct  cour t ’s  appea l to the “sp ir i t” of the  Lanham
Act ,101 an d st ress ed th e requ iremen t t ha t “the defendan ts ’ use
of a p rot ected  ma rk  . . . is a  prerequisite to t he  findin g of a
Lanham Act  violat ion.”102 The court a lso agreed th at  800-
Rese rva t ion  ha d not cau sed th e confusion t ha t cau ses
mis dia ling.  “Hol iday Inns does not  offe r , and  ou r  own  resea rch
has not  p r od u ced, a case in wh ich the d efendan t n either  used
the offending mark  nor  crea ted  t he  confus ion  and  ye t  was
deemed  to have  commi t ted a  t r ademark  infrin gem en t.”103 The
cour t  of appea ls t her eup on r ever sed t he d ist rict  court ’s r ulin g
and d is solved  the in junct ion  aga in st  800-Res er va t ion .104
The S ix th C ircu i t’s  conclusion  r ega rd ing t r ademark
infringem ent  was  unden ia bly  correct , t hough  not  en t ir ely  for
the r igh t  r easons . The cou r t  cor rect ly noted  tha t  the  use of a
protected  ma rk  or a  colora ble imit at ion of one is  a s pecific
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105. S ee supra  Par t II.A.2.
106. Som e commenta tor s  have  lamen ted tha t  t he c ou r t ’s in sis te nce  on s ome
adver t is ing or active promotion of the competi tor’s  m ar k is u nr eas ona bly rigid . S ee
Dame,  supra  note 1, at  1226 (“[T]he mere u se or operation of a telephone num ber,
wheth er  in a lpha nu mer ic form  or not , shou ld be su fficient  to qua lify as  a  ‘use’ under
the Lan ha m Act . . . .”). This r eas onin g, h o weve r,  con fus es  §§ 32  an d 4 3(a ) of th e
Lanham Act.  Un de r §  32,  us e of a  ma rk  or a  copy  or  color ab le i mi ta ti on  of a m ar k
is ab solu te ly r equ ir ed b y th e pl ain  lan gu age  of th e st at ut e. U se of  a  number ,  wi thou t
more, can  on ly b e p ur su ed  un de r §  43(a ).
107. Id . at 1253.
108. Id . at 1255.
109. This  follows because th e word “mark ” does not a ppear  in § 43(a) of t he
Lanham Act.
110. Holiday Inns II , 86  F. 3d  619 , 62 4 (6t h C ir . 19 96).
111. S ee Specialty Brands, Inc. v. Coffee Bean Distribs., Inc., 748 F.2d 669, 671
s t a tu tory requ i rement  be fore  in fr ingemen t can  be foun d un der
§ 32  of the Lanham Act .105 The fact that  the defenda n t  h ad
never  us ed H oliday Inns ’ mark  was not  d ispu ted  and  was
disp ositive of th is point .106
However , the cou r t  over look ed  a  more fu nda men ta l ba si s for
its  decision: Holiday Inns d id  n ot  have a  mark  tha t  was
afforded  p rotect ion  under  § 32  of t he  Lanham Act .  In  it s
compla int , Holida y In ns , In c. alleged, i n te r  a li a , t r ademark
infringem ent  and  un fa i r compet i t ion  u n der  §§ 32 a nd 43 of t he
Lanham Act  r e spect ively, a nd similar state law provisions.
Upon not ing tha t  t he sta nda rd of relief for both  tr adem ar k
infringem ent  an d  u n fa i r com p et i t ion  is  “s u bs t an t i a lly
iden t ica l—likeli hood of confusion ,”107 th e distr ict cour t a na lyzed
th e tw o claims t ogeth er a nd  found a  Lan ha m Act violat ion wit h
resp ect to t he “plain tiff ’s  mark.”108 The distr i ct  cour t ’s  op in ion
did  not  specifically stat e which section of the Act th e defendant
violated. However, th e cou r t ’s u se of t he  word  “mark” in i t s
conclu sion  imp lies t ha t it  focused on § 32.109 The clea r
im pl ica t ion  is that t he district court  consider ed th e ma rk  “1-
80 0-H OL ID AY” to be en t it led  to fed er a l t r ade mark pr otect ion
under  § 32. Becau se th e mar k was  unr egistered, th is was
clear ly wr ong.
The Sixt h  Cir cu it  Cou r t  of App ea ls  pe rpe tua ted  th is  er ror ,
as evidenced by the court ’s acceptan ce of the defend a n t ’s
conces sion  tha t  Holida y Inn s’ un regis ter ed m nem onic was  “fully
ent itled to t ra dem ar k p rot ection .”110 However ,  whe ther  a  mark
is en t it l ed  to t r ademark protection is a qu estion of law ba sed on
under lying facts  and is for th e cour t t o decide.111 The parties’
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(Fed. Cir . 19 84).
112. The only alternat ive for unregistered trademar ks under federal law is an
un fair  competit ion claim u n d e r  § 43(a). Th is will be d iscus sed be low. See infra Par t
IV.B.
113. 943 F.  Su pp . 80 2 (E .D.  Mich . 19 96).
114. The defendan t held t he nu mber s 1-800-408-4255 (“G[zero]-U-HALL”); 1-800-
468-4225 (“GO-U-HALL ”); and  1-800-408-4285 (“G[zero]-U-HAUL”). See id . at 803-04.
115. “1-800-GO-U-HAUL” (1-800-468-4285). See id.  at 804.
116. S ee id . at 810. There were two recorded messa ges . The  fi r st  s t a t ed : “We  a re
no longer  accepting U-Haul reservations. For quality one-way truck rentals, please
call 1-800-GO-RYDER. If you must  reach U -Haul, please  call 313-467-3275.” Id . a t
810. The second recorded message sta ted:
You have r eached  cen t r e 40 Truck Rent al. We regret  to advise you th at we
ha ve been  unilater al ly t er mi na te d w it ho ut  cau se  as  an  au th or ize d U -Ha ul
dealer  by U-Haul Int erna tional. We will thu s be un able to  se rve  ou r
customers. We s in cer ely r egr et  an y in con ven ien ce t o you.  We h ope ou r
differences with  U-Ha ul will be a micably r esolved so th at  we will aga in  be
given the  oppor tun ity t o pr ovide  qu ali ty t ru ck r en ta l se rv ices  for ou r
customers in  t he yea r s  t o come . In  the int er im  you m ay w ish  to s up por t u s
by calling 1-800-GO-RYDER for your next  one-way  t r u ck  r en ta l.  If  you  wan t
to h e a r  U-Hau l’s side of th e stor y, or specifically requ ire a  U-Ha ul r ent al,
please call 313-467-3275. Your support will be greatly appreciated.
Id .
117. S ee id . at 812.
concess ion , therefore, was not determinative. The use
requ i rement of § 32 by its plain terms is pr edicated upon
confusion  with a registered m ark . Unregi ste red  marks  can
re ceive no p rotect ion  under  § 32 of the  Lanham Act  as
tra demark s.112 Since “1-800-HOLI DAY” was not registered,
Holida y Inns’ § 32 claim should have been dismissed from the
ou t set .
Holiday Inns II ha s been followed by s ev er a l d is t r ict  cou r t s
in  the Sixth Circuit.  Most notab ly , in  U-Hau l In ternat ion al , In c.
v. Kr esch ,113 the defenda nt , a form er U-H au l agent , obtained
th ree  mn emonic telephone n um bers 114 com plementary to U-
Haul’s nat ionwide toll-free ren ta l num ber. 115 Defendan t pla yed
a  re corded  me ssa ge to in coming ca ller s exp lain ing t ha t  i t  h ad
been ter min at ed “with out  cau se” by U-Ha ul a nd  dir ectin g
poten t ia l cus tomers  to ca l l Ryder Tr uck Rent al for tru ck rent al
services.116 The d ist r i ct  cour t  ru led  tha t  in  t ak ing  these  act ions
the defen da nt  did n ot infr inge t he fed era lly regis tered mark “U-
Haul” nor u nfairly compete with  U-Haul  in  any  way.117 In
reach ing th is conclusion , th e cou r t  reli ed  pr im ar ily  on the
Holiday Inns II  de cis ion  and i t s h old in g t ha t  in  bot h  the
t r ademark and  unfa i r competition contexts the defendant  must
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118. S ee id . a t 8 10 (“Holiday Inns II  makes i t  clea r  tha t  owning a  complementary
number , alon e, is  not  a vi olat ion of t he  La nh am  Act. I ns te ad , a s how ing  of a c tu al use
of th e m ar k,  i.e ., t he  va ni ty  nu mb er , m us t b e m ad e.”).
119. Only  one court out side the Sixth Circuit has yet cited Holiday Inns II. S ee
Lockheed Mar tin  Corp., v. Net work S olution s, Inc., 44 U .S.P.Q.2d 1 865 (C.D. Cal.
199 7).  Lock heed ,  a case related to Internet domain n ames, considered whether NSI
had violated  th e Lan ha m Act in a llowing the r egistr at ion of domain  na mes  allegedly
confusingly  similar to Lockheed’s federa lly regist ere d ser vice ma rk  “Skun k Wor ks.”
Id . at  1865. Lock heed  cited Holiday Inns II t o  s u p po r t  the proposition that just as
mere ownership an d use of a telephone nu mbe r  did not constitute infringem ent, mer e
“registr at ion o f a  domain  name,  wi thou t  m ore, does not constitu te use of the na me
as a t ra dem ar k.” Id . at 1872. Becaus e its focus was on  in fri ngemen t of a registered
mark, Lock heed ’s f ac t s a r e  not  ana logous  to that  p or t i on  of Holiday Inns II  wh ich
causes  the concern her e.
120. S ee Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Cra ft Boats,  I n c., 489 U.S. 141, 157
(198 9).
121. S ee, e.g., J ohn son & J ohn son v. Qu alit y Pu re M fg., Inc., 484 F. Supp. 975,
979 (D.N.J. 1979) (“When competition is engaged in beyond the boundari es  of fair
play,  th er e is  un fai r co mp et it ion .”).
use a  protected  ma rk  to be liable.118 The p rob lems  wi th  Holiday
Inns II’s ru ling on the u nfair compet ition issue will be
consider ed below, but  it is rem ark able t hat  no courts outside
the S ixt h  Cir cu it  have yet  followed  the d ecis ion .119
IV. UN F A I R  CO M P E T I T I O N : TH E  NE G L E C T E D  TO R T
 In  ma ny decisions regarding telephone mnemonics, cou r t s
have confused the  two tor t s  of t r ademark  in fr ingement  and
unfa i r compet ition. Th is pa rt  will revie w th e genera l principles
and feat ur es of un fair  compet ition la w—both  th e common  law
and unfa ir  compe t it ion  as e mbod ied in  the Lanham Act.  It  will
then a pply those pr in cip les  to Holiday Inns II t o i ll u st r a t e  tha t ,
a l though the Sixth Circuit was cor r ect  in  de termin ing  tha t  no
infringem ent  of a regis t ered m ar k ha d ta ken  place, it fell prey
to th is confusion  a nd im pr operly d ism issed  th e un fair
compet ition cla im.
A. Unfair Com petition La w Generally
 Un fa i r compet ition is  a ver y broa d a nd  flexible commer cial
tor t  th at  has  its roots in th e comm on law of deceit .120 Unfa i r
compe t it ion  defies complete definition in th e abst ra ct. The
definit ion of unfa ir  compe t it ion  can  be circula r: it  is compe tit ive
conduct  t ha t  s eems un fa i r.121 This  definition ha s been  compared
to Ju stice Stewart’s “I know it when I see it” definition of hard-
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122. S ee 1  MCCA RT H Y, supra  not e 6, § 1 :9 (“[The  defin iti ons  of un fair  comp et iti on]
sou nd [] ver y m uch  lik e Mr . J us ti ce S te wa rt ’s defi ni ti on  of h a r d -c or e por nogr ap hy : ‘I
know it wh en I  see it .’”) (quot in g J aco bel lis  v. O hi o, 37 8 U .S.  184 , 19 7 (19 64)).
123. S ee Wat er Gr emlin  Co. v. Ideal F ishing F loat Co., 401 F. Supp. 809, 811 (D.
Minn . 197 5) (“Th e e ss en ce of t he  la w of u nfa ir  com pe ti ti on  is fa ir  pla y.”).
124. Dutcher  v. H ar ke r,  377  S.W .2d  140 , 14 5 (Mo.  Ct . App . 19 64).
125. Ame ri can  Her ita ge Life Ins. Co. v. Herita ge Life Ins. Co., 494 F.2d 3, 14
(5th  Cir . 19 74).
126. Ely-Norr is Safe Co. v. Mosler Sa fe Co., 7 F.2d 603, 604 (2d Cir. 19 25), rev’d ,
273 U. S. 1 32 (1 927 ).
127. Dior  v. Milton , 155 N.Y.S.2d  443, 451, aff ’d , 156 N.Y.S.2d 996 (Sup . C t .
195 6).
128. Academy  of Motion Picture A r t s a n d Sciences v. Benson, 104 P.2d 650, 653
(Cal. 1940) (quot ing Am erica n P hila telic Soc. v. Cla ibour ne, 46 P.2d 135, 140 (Cal.
193 5)).
core pornography .122 Ne ver thele ss , cour t s s omet im es  de fine
un fair  compet ition a s “fair  pla y”123 or “prin ciples of honesty  and
fair  dea ling.”124 The Fifth Circuit has stat ed: “[t ]he  law of unfa i r
compe t it ion  is  the u mbr ell a  for  a ll s t a tu tory a nd n onst a tu tory
causes of act ion  a r i sing ou t  of business  conduct  which  i s
con t r a ry to hon est  pr act ice in ind us tr ial or comm ercia l
mat ters.”125
The law of un fair  compet ition has cha nged  along w ith  th e
evolu t ion  of busin ess t ypes an d met hods. “[T]her e i s n o pa r t  of
the la w which  is  more  pl a st i c than  unfa i r  compet it ion ,  and
what wa s n ot  reck oned  an  act ion able  wr ong 25  yea rs a go m ay
have become such  today.”126 Unfa i r  compet it ion  i s not ,  and was
never  intended to be, a s ta tic a rea  of the la w becau se it
r epresen t s such  a  dynamic and  sh i ft i ng  pa r t  of Amer ica n
society.  “[T]he legal concept  of unfair compet ition ha s evolved
as a br oad a nd  flexible doctrin e with  a capa city for furt her
growth  to m eet  cha ngin g condit ions.”127 Because  of t h is  capaci ty
for  change,  cour t s  r eta in  the e qu ita ble power to create n ew
rem edies as times and circumstances chan ge, regardless of the
exi st en ce of close preceden t  or  es tabli sh ed  la be ls  for  a
par t icu la r wr ong. “Wh en  a  sch em e is  evolved  wh ich  on it s fa ce
violates  th e fun da me nt al r ule s of hone st y an d fair  dea ling, a
cour t  of equity  is  not  impoten t  t o frus t r a t e i t s consummat ion
becau se t he  sche me  is a n or igina l one.”128 Thu s, a  court  ma y fill
the gap s a nd  imp ose liabilit y for u nfa ir  p ract i ces  whether  or  not
an esta blished category for the practice exists.
Alth ough  th e definitions of un fair competition a re vagu e,
one th ing is clear: the law of trademar ks is a  subca tegory  of the
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129. S ee Hanover S ta r M illi ng  Co. v . Me tca lf, 2 40 U .S.  403 , 41 3 (19 16);
Par amet er  Driven Softwar e, Inc. v. Massachus etts  Bay Ins. Co., 25 F.3d 332, 337 (6th
Cir . 1994 ); see also Mona ha n, supra  note 60, at  284 (“In the  rea lm of mn emon ic
mark s, unfair competition may be used to protect mnemonic users wh o  ar e not  able
to ach iev e t ra de ma rk  ri gh ts .”).
130. S ee supra  note 13.
131. S ee Bonit o Boats , Inc. v. Th un der  Cra ft Boat s, In c., 489 U.S. 1 41, 157
(198 9).  Pa ss in g off  is defined as “the selling of a good of one’s own creat ion  unde r  t he
n a m e or  mark of  an oth er.” Qualitex Co. v. Ja cobson Pr ods. Co., 13 F.3d 1297, 1303
(5th  Cir. 19 86), rev’d on  oth er grou nd s, 51 4 U .S.  159  (199 5).
132. S ee 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (Supp. 1996) (incorporating th e 1995 federal
an tid ilu tion  stat ute).
133. S ee H or me l F oods  Cor p. v . J im  He ns on  Pr ods ., I nc. , 73  F. 3d  497 , 50 7 (2d
Cir . 199 6).
134. S ee Jordach e  E nters ., Inc. v. Hogg Wyld, Ltd., 828 F.2d 1482, 1490 (10th
Cir . 1987) (noting t ha t  dive rs ion  of cu st om er s is  con sid er ed  un fai r co mp et it ion  pe r s e);
In t ’l Ne ws  Se rv . v. As soci at ed  Pr es s, 2 48 U .S.  215 , 23 6 (19 18).
135. Mur p h y Door  Bed Co. v. Int erior  Sleep Sys ., Inc., 874 F .2d 95, 102 (2d Cir .
198 9).
136. S ee Qua lit ex, 13 F .3d a t 1 303 (“[A] claim  of un fair  comp et iti on u nd er  § 43(a )
is no  lon ger  lim it ed  to c as es  of pa ss in g off.”).
137. S ee Centu ry 21 Real Es tat e Corp. v. Sandlin, 846 F.2d 11 75, 1178  (9 th  Ci r .
198 8); see also Polo Fashions, In c. v. Extra Special Pr ods., Inc., 451 F. Supp. 555, 558
(S. D.N. Y. 197 8).
more gener al la w of unfa ir comp etit ion .129 This principle leads
in exor ably to a t  lea st  one con clu sion: one who is  gu ilt y of
t r ademark infr ingem ent  is n ecessa rily gu ilty of un fair
compe t it ion . However , th e convers e is not n ecessar ily tru e: even
if one has  not  infr inged a  regis tered or  common law t rademark,
one may s t ill  be  gu ilt y of u nfa ir  compe t it ion  because of t he
g rea t e r br ea dt h of un fair  compet ition  law . This is tr ue even
under  the  Lanham Act .130
T h e origina l pu rp ose of unfa ir comp etit ion law  wa s to
preven t  confus ion  a s  t o the  sou rce  of goods , or  pa ss in g off.131
However , unfa i r  compet it ion  law  now r ecogn ize s ca use s of
act ion  for  other  conduct  such  as  d ilu t ion ,132 which includes
di sparagement  of r epu ta t ion , or  t a rn ishmen t ;133 diver sion  of
business values, including customers;134 an d “mis ap pr opria tion
of th e sk ill, expen dit ur es, a nd  la bor  of anothe r ,”135 or  in  other
words, rid ing on  the coa t t a ils  of another  bu sines s.  At  l ea s t  some
of these br oade r  cause s of a ct ion  may be  pu rsu ed  unde r  § 43(a )
of t he  Lanham Act .136
The test  for u nfair compet ition—wheth er t he a ctivity cau ses
a  lik eli hood of con fus ion—is the  same  as tha t  for  t r ademark
infringem ent .137 Th is sim ila r it y t en ds  to blu r  the d is t in ct ion
D :\ 1 9 9 9- 1\ F I N A L \ M K I N -F I N . W P D Ja n .  8 ,  2001
435] TELE PH ONE  MNE MONICS 459
138. 15 U. S.C . § 11 25 (1 994 ).
between  th e two tor ts, cau sing some courts  to conclude,
whet her  conscious ly  or  unconscious ly , tha t  in fr ingement  and
unfa i r compe t it ion  a re coexten sive. Th e scope of unfa ir
compe t it ion , however, is  much  b roader  t han  t r ademark
infringem ent  law. E ssen tia lly, un fair  compet ition la w is
designed  to fill  in  the ga ps  wh er e m ore n ar row r u les , such  as
t r ademark or  pa ten t  in fr ingeme n t , do not reach improper
conduct .
B. Unfa ir  Com pet it ion  Un der the Lan ham  Act
 While § 32 of the La nh am  Act rela tes  specifically t o
infringem ent  of regist ere d t ra dem ar ks , § 43 concer ns  un fair
compe t it ion  and is more broad. Section 43 provides in part  that :
( a ) C i v il  Ac t i o n
(1 ) An y p er son  wh o, on  or in  conn ect ion  wit h  an y good s or
se rv ices , o r  any  con ta ine r  for  goods , u ses  in  commer ce  any
w o r d , te rm , n am e, sy m bol, o r  d evice , or a n y com bin at ion
the r eo f, o r  any  f a l se d esign at ion of orig in, fa lse or  m islea din g
de scr ipt ion  of fact, or  false  or m is l e a d in g r ep re se n ta tion  of
fact , wh ich —
(A) is lik ely t o cau se  confu sion , or t o cau se  m ist ak e, or
t o d e ce iv e  a s t o th e a ffiliat ion , conn ect ion , or a ss ociat ion  of
s u ch  pe rs on  wit h  an oth er  pe rs on , or a s t o th e or igin ,
sp on s o r s h ip , o r  approva l  o f h i s  o r  he r  goods , s e rv i ces , or
com m er cial  act ivit ies  by a n oth er  pe rs on , or
(B)  in com m er cial a d v e r tis in g or  pr om otion ,
m i s r e p r es e n t s th e n at ur e, cha ra cter ist ics, qua l i t i e s ,  or
geogr ap hic  o r ig in  o f  h i s  or  he r  o r  ano th e r  pe r son’s  goods ,
se rv ices ,  or  commer c ia l  ac t iv it i e s ,
s h a ll be lia ble in  a  c iv il  a ct i on  b y  a n y  p er s on  w h o  b el ie v es  t h a t
h e or  sh e is  or i s lik ely  to b e d a m a ged  by s u ch  a ct. 138
Th e cr it ica l d iffer en ce be tween  § 43(a ) and § 32 is  tha t  § 43(a )
refers  to the  use  of “any word , t e rm, name, s ym bol,  or  de vice , or
any combin a t ion  th ereof.” The t erm  “register ed ma rk ,” while an
essen t ia l pa r t  of § 32 , does not a ppear  in § 43(a). Fur th erm ore,
the word  “ma rk ” does n ot a ppe ar  in a ny form  an ywher e in
§ 43(a). The n at ur al conclusion, th erefore, is tha t § 43(a) applies
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139. S ee 4 MCCA RT H Y, supra  note  6, § 27:14 (“Section 43 (a) was origin ally
envisioned as a feder a l anti-false advertising statute, with emphasis on the ‘false
des crip tion  or  re pr es en ta ti on ’ lan gu ag e.”).
140. S ee Feder al-Mogu l-Bower Bea rin gs, Inc. v. Azoff, 313 F.2d 4 05, 409 (6th  Cir.
1963) (quotin g Sam son Cr an e Co. v. Un ion Na t’l Sales, I nc., 87 F. Supp. 218, 222 (D.
Mass. 194 9)).
141. S ee, e.g., Metro Pu bl’g, Ltd. v. San J ose Mercury Ne ws, 987 F.2d 637, 640
(9th  Cir. 1993) (“It is not  necess ar y th at  a t ra dem ar k be r egistered in  orde r  fo r  it  t o
qu al ify for protection un der th e Lanh am Act.”); Banff, Ltd. v. Federa ted Dept. Stores,
Inc.,  841 F .2d  486 , 489  (2d C ir . 198 8) (n oti ng  th at  § 43(a ) of th e La nh am  Act
“p rotect s no t on ly r egi st er ed  tr ad em ar ks , bu t u nr egi st er ed  ma rk s . .  . a s w ell ”).
142. The au thor  cons ide r s th is in te rp re ta tion  coun te r-in tu iti ve be cau se i t d oes n ot
logically fit t he  st ru ctu re  of th e La nh am  Act . As n ote d, § 3 2 of t he  La nh am  Act
addresses  tra dem ark  infr ing em en t, a nd  re fer s on ly t o regi st ered  marks. If Congress
had intended to extend protection to unregistered marks a s we ll, § 3 2  wou ld  seem the
most logical place to find it. On th e other  han d, as noted , § 43(a )  does  not  i nclude  the
wor d “mark” a t  a l l.  Limit ing t r ademark  p rotect ion  unde r  the  Lanham Ac t  to
regi stered  ma rk s wou ld b e con sis te nt  wit h t he  cur re nt  st at e of t he  la w of cop yr i gh t s,
in  which a federal cause of action for copyright infringem ent a bsolutely requires a
valid  federa l copyright  regis tr at ion. S ee 17 U .S.C . § 411  (1994 ) (“[N]o act ion for
in fr ingemen t of the copyr ight  in a ny wor k s ha ll b e in st it ut ed  un ti l r egi st ra ti on  of th e
copyright  cla im  ha s b ee n m ad e in  acco rd an ce w it h t hi s t it le. ”).
The pr ote ction  of common  law t r ademarks is generally consistent with th e breadth
of § 43(a), though it should perhaps be called by anoth er na me. Since § 43(a) does
no t refer  to  t rademarks  a t  a l l , i t  seems improper  to  ta lk  ab ou t  t r ademark
in fr ingemen t under  this section. Where a common-law tr adem ark is  involved,
en fo rcemen t of § 43(a ) sh ould  sim ply b e con sid er ed a not he r t ype  of un fair  comp et iti on
ac tion .
143. S ee 3 MCCA RT H Y, supra  not e 6,  § 27:1 4 n .2 (li st in g 16  fede ra l dis tr ict  an d
circuit  court  cases fr om 1972 t hr ough 19 94 th at  un iformly a dh ered to th is principle,
and de cla ri ng  th at  th e on e t ha t d id n ot “is  no t g ood l aw  an d is  an  ab er ra ti on ”).
144. S ee Cent ur y 21 Rea l Est at e Corp . v. San dlin, 846 F .2d 1175, 1178 (9t h Cir .
198 8); see also Polo Fashions, In c. v. Extra Special Pr ods., Inc., 451 F. Supp. 555, 558
(S. D.N. Y. 197 8).
145. S ee Two  Pe sos , In c. v. T aco  Ca ba na , In c., 5 05 U .S.  763 , 76 7 (19 92).
t o situations of unfair  compet it ion even where  no mark,
registered or otherwise, is involved.
This  obs er va t ion , h owever, is n ot t he  end  of the  st ory.
Section  43(a) was originally interpr eted to reach only false
ad ver tis ing. 139 However, beginning in 1963 , feder al cour ts  ha ve
extend ed th is  s ect ion  to other  forms  of unfa i r  compet it ion  tha t
were  pr eviously on ly p rotect ed under  sta te common law,140
includ ing infringemen t of unr egister ed, or common-law,
t r a d e m a r k s . 1 4 1  T h is  s om e wh a t  cou n t e r -i n t u i t i ve
int erp ret at ion142 of § 43(a ) h as since gained almost universal
acceptan ce.143 Wh er e § 43 (a) is invoked to p rotect  a  common-law
trademark, the § 32 pr in cip les  of lik eli hood of con fusion 144 and
distinctiveness 145 simila r ly a pp ly.  Ne ver thele ss , t h is  ext en sion
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146. S ee Holiday Inns I , 83 8 F . Su pp . 12 47,  125 3 (E .D.  Te nn . 19 93) (“[U ]nfai r
comp et iti on  is a  br oad  field  within which lies the concept of tradema rk
in fr ingemen t . . . . ”).
147. S ee Holiday Inns II , 86 F.3d 619, 626 (6th Cir. 1996) (“[T ]he defendants’ use
of a protected  m ark  .  . .  is  a  prerequisite to t he  fin din g of a  La nh am  Act v iola ti on .”);
cf. Mona ha n, supra  note 60, at 301 (“What is conspicuo us ly  absen t  from the S ix th
Circu it ’s opin ion  is t re at me nt  of th e u nfa ir  com pe ti ti on  cla im .”).
148. 15 U. S.C . § 11 14(1 )(a) (1 994 ).
149. Id . § 1125.
150. S ee Ern st & Er nst  v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197-98 & 199 n.20 (1975)
(defining  a d evi ce a s t ha t w hi ch i s for me d b y de sig n; a  con tr iva nce ; an  in ven ti on ).
of th e Lanham Act  to cover  unregi ste red  marks  has  been  the
cause of significant  confusion in  the court s, an d a ppe ar s t o ha ve
confused  the S ix th  Ci rcu i t  in  the  Holiday Inns II case.
C. App licat ion  of U nfa ir  Com pet it ion  Law  to Holiday Inns II
 The d is t r ict  cour t  in  Holiday Inn s I  paid lip ser vice to the
fact  tha t  unfa i r compet it ion  i s b roader  than  t rademark
infringem ent ,146 but  in it s confusion  over t he s imilar ity  of th e
s t anda rd of lia bil it y blur red  the t wo t or t s and th eir boundar ies.
On  app ea l, t he S ixt h  Cir cu it  ably  disce rned  the a bs en ce of
t rademark  in fr ingement ,  bu t  was blinde d b y t he d is t r ict  cour t ’s
ama lgamat ion  of i nfr ingemen t  and  un fa i r compet i t ion  in to a
sin gle lump  an d did not s epar at e the issues.147 As  a  resu lt ,  the
Sixt h  Cir cuit  effectively limit ed  unfa ir  compe t it ion  to a  scop e
coextens ive with tr adem ar k infrin gement .
In  doing s o, H oliday Inns II  over look ed  the basic di ffer en ce
between  tr adem ar k infrin gement  and  unfa i r competition under
the Lanha m Act. That is, t r ade mark in fr in gem en t  unde r  § 32 of
the Lanha m Act imposes liability upon any person who uses a
“reproduct ion , coun te rfeit , copy, or  colorable  im it a t ion  of a
register ed mark”148 In  Holiday Inns II,  the re was no register ed
mark . However , u nde r  § 43(a ) of the Lanham Act , liabil it y for
unfa i r compet it i on will lie against any person who uses “any
word, ter m, na me, sym bol, or device” in  a w ay w hich  is lik ely t o
cause confusion .149 Wh ile  a  t ele ph one n umber  normally  doe s n ot
qua lify as a  protecta ble mar k, it cert ainly qua lifies as eit her  a
t e rm, symbol, or device. As used in  th e law, and  cons is tent  with
its  usage in t he L an ha m Act, t he t erm  device most  na tu ra lly
me an s a  contr ivan ce, an  inven tion , a  p roject  or  schem e, us ua lly
one de sign ed  to se rve a  sp ecia l purpos e, or  per form a  specia l
funct ion .1 5 0 A teleph one n um ber  su rely fit s wit hin  th is
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151. Holiday Inns II , 86 F.3d a t 625 (citin g Fr isch ’s  R estaurants, In c. v. Elby’s
Big Boy , In c., 67 0 F .2d  642 , 64 8 (6t h C ir . 19 82)).
152. S ee id. at 625-26.
153. S ee Holiday Inns I , 83 8 F . Su pp . 12 47,  125 4 (E .D.  Te nn . 19 93).
154. S ee id .
155. S ee i d .; see also Mur phy D oor Bed Co. v. Inter ior Sleep Sys., Inc., 874 F.2d
95, 102  (2d C ir . 19 89).
156. S ee Jor dache E nte rs., In c. v. Hogg Wyld, L td .,  828 F .2d  1482,  1490  (10th
Cir . 1987). 
definit ion  of “devi ce” because  it  is  a  cont r iva nce or
inven tion —albeit  abst r act—tha t  is  des igned to per form a
specia l funct ion  with in  the  te lephone system . Thus, wh ile the
defendan t  in Holiday Inns II did not use a “mark,” its use of a
tele ph one num ber, 800-Reser v at i on , di d con st it u te t he u se  of a
device. The cour t t her efore sh ould h ave en gaged  in a n a na lysis
of unfa ir  compe t it ion .
Turn ing to the ques t ion  of lik eli hood of con fu s ion , t he  Sixth
Circu it  in Holiday Inns II cited eight factors out lined in Frisch’s
Restau rants,  In c. v . E lby’s Bi g B oy, Inc.: “(1 ) s t reng th  of the
pla int iff’s mar k; (2) relatedness of the goods; (3) simila r it y of
the ma rk s; (4) evidence of actu al confus ion; (5) mar ket ing
channe ls use d; (6 ) lik ely  de gr ee  of pu rchaser  care; (7)
defendan t ’s in ten t ; and (8 ) lik elihood of expa nsion of th e
product  lines us ing th e ma rk s.”151 Because the  cour t  found  tha t
the defendan t  d id  not  u se a  mark, t he cour t d id n ot a ctu ally
conside r  thes e fa ctors. 152
On the ot her  hand,  the d is t r ict  cour t  rea ched  the “lik eli hood
of confus ion” ana lysi s,  bu t  s topped  shor t  by cons ider ing on ly
one of the  eight  Frisch’s Restaurants  factor s , t he  de fendan t ’s
in ten t , and deemed tha t intent su fficient to establish a
lik eli hood of confusion .153 Alt hough  it  misapp lied  § 32 as
discussed  above, t he  court  wa s corr ect in  not ing t ha t t he
defendan t ’s i nt en t  was  a  cr itica l factor ; thus  it s  ana lysi s was
cor rect , as far  as i t went . The defendant ’s adm itted in tent  was
t o divert customers from Holiday Inns. 154 Notab ly , the
defendan t ’s busin ess flour ished des pite n egligible ad ver tis ing.
By int ent iona lly seek ing t o capita lize  on  th e fam e an d goodwill
of Holida y In ns  an d it s es ta blish ed cu st omer  bas e, th e
d efe n da n t  i n t e n t i o n a l l y m i s a p p r o p r i a t e d  t h e  s k il l ,
expenditures,  and  labor  of Holiday Inns.155 Such int ent  ma y be
consider ed un fair competition per  se.156 St ill, as a  st ron ger ba sis
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157. S ee Holiday Inns II , 86 F.3d at 625.
158. S ee supra no te 138  and accompany ing  t ex t .
159. S ee Holiday Inns II , 86 F.3d at 625.
160. S ee Courten ay Brian  Allen, Note, Holiday Inns, In c. v. 800 Reserva t ion , Inc.:
Defining Us e of a M ark  an d t he S our ce of Con fu sion  in T rad em ark  In fri ng em ent , 49
BAYLOR L. RE V. 847 , 85 7 (19 97).
161. 50 F. Su pp. 891 (D. Md . 1943), aff ’d , 14 0 F .2d  387  (4t h C ir . 19 44).
162. Id . at 900.
163. S ee Dam e, supra  note 1, at 1231 (“[C]onfusion as t o th e sou rce  [of goods or
services] sh ould  not  be m ist ak en  wit h con fus ion a s t o th e ope ra tion  of a telep hon e.”).
for  decision, both court s should h ave consulted t he r e m a in ing
factors as Holiday Inns insisted.157
Like § 32, th e pla in l a n guage of § 43(a) incorporates a
causa t ion  element .158 This elem en t of cau sa tion  als o ma y ha ve
been sa t is fi ed  in  Holiday Inns II.  Unfor tuna tely, t he  Sixth
Circu it  never r eached t his issu e. The cour t  of appea l s was
cor r e ct  in  reason ing tha t  the  confus ion  tha t  causes  misd ia l ing
was not  crea ted  by  the defendant , but  exist ed in depe nd ent ly
among th e dia ling pu blic.1 5 9 Her e, the dist inction between
carelessness and  confusion is  import an t. Court s ha ve been
carefu l t o note tha t  mere ca re lessness  on  the pa r t  of consumers
does not constitu te confusion so as to give rise to tra dema rk
infringem ent .160 For  example , in  Pen nzoi l Co. v . Cr own Central
Pet roleum  Corp.,161 a compet it or  of Pen nzoil developed a
greenish lubricating oil and calle d it  “Gr een zoil.” In  findin g no
lik eli hood of confusion, th e cour t n oted th e ver y differen t d esign
of th e t wo compa ny’s oil can s a nd  conclude d t ha t, a l t h ou gh
the re were some instances of cus tomers  ask ing if Greenzoil was
made  by th e sa me comp an y as  Pen nzoil, “[o]nly occasiona l cases
of confus ion  or  t hough t le ss  er ror s  by  ve ry ina t t en t ive
purchaser s ar e of litt le sign ificance.”162 Similarly, thoughtless
e r ror s by very inat ten tive t elephone u sers  should n ot be
s u fficient  to show unfair competition on the part  of a pas sive
recip ient  of teleph one calls. It is rea sonable t o assum e th at
misd ia l ing is gen era lly th e re su lt  of consumer carelessness or
pr eexist ing confus ion . Fu r thermore , t he  Lanham Act  speaks
sp ecifi ca lly t o confusion  as t o sou rce, or igin , or  a ffilia t ion  of
goods or  se rvices , n ot  confus ion  a s  t o how to opera t e  a
teleph one.163
However , othe r  cons idera t ions  can  a ffect  whe ther  a
complemen ta ry number  has  “caused” consu m e r  confusion . F or
examp le, new market  pa r ticipan t s  have  an  affi rmat ive  du ty to
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164. S ee Ke llog g Co.  v. N at ion al  Bis cui t C o., 3 05 U .S.  111  (193 8).
165. The message stat ed:
He llo. You ha ve misd ial ed a nd  ha ve n ot r ea che d H olida y In ns  or a ny  of
i t s affiliates. You’ve called 800 Reservat ions, Am erica’s fastes t gr owing
independen t computerized hotel reser va t i on  service. On e of our high ly
tra ined ho tel  r ese rva t ion  spec ia l is t s  wi ll  be  with  you  momenta r i ly  t o
provide th e Holida y Inn s nu mber  or to a ssist  you  i n  finding the lowest
r a t e at over 19,000 propert ies  wor ldwide, including such hotel chains as
Holiday Inns, Guest  Qua rt ers , Ha mpt on In n, Sh era ton , Comfort  Inn , an d
many more. If you ar e a mem ber  of a  ho tel ’s  frequent  guest  p rogram,
h ave  tha t  number  ready . P lease  s tay on  the l ine ,  ass i stance  is  ju s t  a
moment  awa y.
Holiday Inns II , 86  F. 3d  619 , 62 1 (6t h C ir . 19 96).
166. S ee id .
167. S ee 15 U .S. C. § 1 125 (a) (1 994 ).
168. S ee Hor ky, supra  note 83, at  252.
169. S ee Mona ha n, supra  note 60, at  307.
170. S ee Smit h, supra  note 67, at  1110-12.
171. S ee Allen, supra note 160, at  862.
preven t  confusion with senior compet i t or s;164 where  a  holde r  of
a  complementa ry  number  fa i ls to t ake  steps to do so,  the
causa t ion  elem en t m ay be  sa tis fied. In  H oliday In ns I  and
Holiday Inns II ,  t he defendan t ,  a t  the beginn ing of each ca ll,
explained  in a r ecorded  mess age t h a t  the  cus tomer  had not
rea ched Holiday Inns.165 However, Holiday Inn s offered
numerous affida vits  to sh ow th at  th e m ess age  did  not  p lay  a t
the beginn ing of every call. 166 This factua l issue wa s never
resolved. If in fact  some s ignifican t p ropor tion  of misdia ling
callers did n ot h ea r t his  me ssa ge, it  could be ar gued t ha t 800-
Rese rva t ion  contr ibut ed t o th e confusion. I f cust omer s’ calls
indeed  were cau sed by 800-Reserva tion’s use of a
complemen ta ry ph one n um ber , th e Sixt h Cir cuit  could h ave
found in favor of Holiday Inns.167
V. P OL IC Y CO N S I DE R AT I ON S
 C om m e n t a t or s  h a v e on l y g r u dg in gly support ed t h e
pr otection  of tele ph one mnemonics. Some u rge t ha t m nem onics
should me et  high er  st an da rd s t o qua lify for  t rademark
protect ion .168 Some a rgue  tha t  mnemonics should only be
protected  from each  othe r ,169 wh ile som e su ggest  am en din g th e
Lanham Act .170 Ot her s s ee  the fr ee  use  of complemen ta ry
numbers by com p et itor s a s a  desir able  aid  to economic
compet ition .1 7 1  Th e Lanham Act  se ek s t o st r ik e a  ba la nce
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172. S ee Sun beam  Pr ods., Inc. v. West  Bend  Co., 123 F.3d 246, 26 0 (5th Cir .
1997) (“The  La nh am  Act e mb odie s t wo s tr on g cou nt er va ilin g pol icie s: p ro te cti on  of th e
p ropr ie t a ry in t ere s t  in dist inct ive t ra dem ar ks , m ini mi zin g cons um er  confu sion  an d
max imizing consum er confidence, versus fostering competition and its at tendan t
economic ben efit s.”).
173. S ee gen erally, AD A M  SMITH , AN  IN Q U I RY  IN T O  TH E  NATURE AND CAUSES OF
T H E WE A LT H  O F  NA T IO N S, 78-79 (R.H. Camp bell et a l. eds., Oxford P ress 1976) (1775)
(“[T]he  price of free  comp et iti on . .  . is t he  lowes t w hich  can  be t ak en  . . . for  a n y
consider able  tim e t oget he r.”); R ICHARD A. P O S N E R, E CONOMIC AN A LY SI S  O F LAW  8 (4th
ed. 199 2) (“The forces of competition tend t o make oppor tu ni ty  cost  the  maximum as
well as  mi ni mu m p ri ce.”).
174. Eas t e rn Win e Co rp . v. W in slo w-Wa r r e n , L td .,  137 F .2d  955 , 958  (2d  Ci r .
194 3).
175. S ee S. RE P . NO . 79-1333 (1946), reprinted in  1946 U.S.C.C.S. 1274, 1275
(noting  th at  th e L an ha m Ac t’s ba sic p olicy  is d es ign ed  to p ro mo te  com pe ti ti on ).
176. S ee, e.g., Gregg D u ffey, Comm ent , Trademark  Dilution Under the Federal
Tradem ark  Dilution Act of 1995: You’ve Com e a Long W ay B aby —T oo Fa r, M ayb e?,
between  pr omotin g free economic compet it ion  on  the  one  hand,
and protectin g propert y rights  an d preven ting consum er
confusion  on  the  othe r .172 In ligh t of the obvious  err ors in  th e
Sixt h  Circu it’s a na lysis of th is iss ue in  Holiday Inns II,  t he
rem aind er  of th is comm ent  will review the fun dam ent al
economic and legal p olicies t ha t u nd erlie  tr ad ema rk  an d u nfa ir
compe t it ion  law in order  to fashion a work able ru le tha t
encoura ges th e policy goals of the tr adem ar k syst em, yet a t t he
same t ime observes  the  pla in  l angu a ge  and na tu re  of the
L a n h a m Act. This comment concludes tha t holders of
mnemonics, eith er as register ed tr adem ar ks or u nr egistered
mar ks, shou ld en joy grea ter  p rotect ion  from complementa ry
number  holders  than  Holiday Inns II provided.
A. Free Mar ket Policies
 S ince the t i m e of Ad a m  S m it h , the p res er va t ion  of a free
ma rk et  econ omy in  the U nit ed  St a tes  has b een  ba se d u pon  the
genera l pr em ise t ha t  unfet t er ed  compe t it ion  t ends t o keep
qua li ty and  product ivi ty up  and p r ices  down.173 The l aw
r e cognizes th is  pr in cip le gen er a lly: “[T]her e is  a  ba sic publi c
policy, deep -rooted  in ou r e conomy a nd  respected  by th e
cour t s .  . .  that social welfare is best  ad vanced by free
compe t it ion  . . . .”174 This  sa me p rin ciple ap plies in  th e
t r ademark an d u nfa ir comp etit ion  conte xts 175 and  leads  some
commenta tor s  t o conclude  tha t  unfa i r  compet it ion  l aw has gon e
too far  in  the d ir ect ion  of regu la t in g com pe t it ion .176
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39 S. TE X. L. RE V. 133 (1997); Ken net h B. Ge rm ain , Un fai r T rad e Pra ctices  Un der
S ecti on  43(a) of th e La nh am  Act : You ’ve Com e a L ong  Wa y B aby —T oo Fa r, M ayb e?,
49 IN D . L.J . 84 (1 973 ).
177. S ee SMITH , supra  note 173, at  456.
178. S ee ROBERT  L. H E I L BR O N E R, TH E  WO RLD LY P HILOSPHE RS  70 (6th ed. 1986)
(“I f the workin g of the m ark et is tru sted to produce the greatest nu mber of goods at
the lowest possible prices, anything tha t inter feres with th e mar ket n ecessarily lowers
social we lfa re .”).
179. SMITH , supra  note 173, at  145.
180. S ee Econom ides, supra  note 59, at  532 (citing E DWARD H ASTINGS
CH A M BE RL I N , TH E  TH E O R Y O F  MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION , Ch. IV & App. E (8th ed.
Harva rd Un iv. P re ss  196 9)).
181. 1 MCCA RT H Y, supra  not e 6, § 2:3. 
182. S ee Lan des & P osner , supra  note 15, at  265-66.
183. S ee generally, 1 MCCA RT H Y, supra  not e 6, § 2:1. 
However, under t raditional free mark et theory, things th a t
inter fere with t he “invisible hand”177 of t he  marke t  a r e
consider ed th e en e m y of p rosper i ty .178 Adam Smi th cons idered
mon opolies, wh et her  crea ted  by gover nmen t  con t r ol or  se lf-
inter ested  collus ion, to be t he gr eat est  of thes e en emie s: “People
of th e sa me  tr ad e seld om m eet  toget he r,” he  noted, “bu t  the
conver sa t ion  ends in a conspiracy against th e publ ick, or in
some contr ivan ce to r ais e pr ices.”179 Oth er p ra ctices , s u ch  as
false advertising, produce similar effects. Thus,  some amount  of
regu la t ion  i s r equ ired to pr eve nt  collu sion  and obfusca t ion
detr iment al to th e free ma rk et.
Some economist s  have cr iticized tra demark  protection as a
crea tor  of monopolies, concluding t ha t it s erves n o beneficial
econ omic pur pose.180 Howeve r, t he se view s r epr esen t on ly a
small minor i ty . It is widely recognized tha t t ra dema rk s ser ve at
least two va lu able  econ om i c p u rposes: “(1) th ey encour age th e
pr oduct ion of qua lity products ; and (2) they red uce the
cus tomer ’s cos t s  of shopping  and making  purchasing
decision s.”181 Some econom ist s expla in t his  purpose (or perhaps,
more accura te ly , i t s e ffect ) a s  p r imar i ly  that  of encourag ing
economic efficiency.182 Unfa i r  compet it ion  l aw,  on  the other
hand,  is  typ ica lly  not  exp la in ed  in  ter ms of economic policies,
bu t is  roote d in  cons ider a t ion s of fa i rnes s a nd t he p ubli c’s
interest  in not be ing deceived.183 Yet these purposes overlap in
many ways , an d t o th e exte nt  th at  un fair  compet ition la w
promotes  the s a m e desir able  end s a s t ra dem ar k la w, it s hou ld
be a na lyzed in  th e sa me  wa y.
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184. S ee generally, SMITH , supra  note 173.
185. John Wrigh t , Inc.  v.  Casper Corp., 419 F. Supp . 292, 324 (E.D. Pa. 1976)
rev’d  in  par t su b n om . Don sco,  In c. v. C as pe r C or p.,  587  F. 2d  602  (3d C ir . 19 78).
186. S ee 15 U .S. C. § 1 125 (a)(1 )(A) (199 4).
Aspect s of the free market r ationale support both sides of
the complem en ta ry n umber  cont rover sy . Im pos in g liabil it y on
complemen ta ry n u mber  holder s s hould  ten d t o pr omote
economic pr osper ity because the  use  of complemen ta ry
numbers can  h inder  normal s u pp ly  and demand  forces  tha t
help  as su re  th at  qua lity a nd  pr oduct ivity go u p, a nd  pr ices go
down. For  exam ple, a  significan t d ifference in  th e qu alit y
between  two busines se s’ goods an d ser vices sh ould n orm ally
resul t in t he m ore efficien t  and  qua l ity  conscious  company
gra du ally ob ta in ing  a l arger  market  sha re.  However, if
consumers confu se th ese tw o comp an ies in  th eir m ind  an d in
th eir  pa t ronage beca use  of the  use  of a  complementa ry
mn emon ic telephone num ber, the opposite result is possible. In
the end , cons um ers  ma y receive poorer  qua lit y  goods  and
services, bu t  a ssocia te  t hem wi t h t he  company tha t  i s actua l ly
more qua lity cons cious. I f t h e bett er compan y eventu ally goes
out  of busin ess becaus e of th i s confus ion ,  the marke t  may be
ope n  to m onopolist ic pra ctices by a  sole su rvivor , t h us
thwar t ing th e goals  of qua lity, efficiency, and low pr ice  tha t
tr adem ar k an d un fair competition law s eeks t o promote.
On th e other  ha nd, t he essen ce of free, unfett ered
compe t it ion  is to allow an en tr epren eur  to see an  un sat isfied
need  in t he m ar ket  an d exploit  it. 184 If the economic incentive to
fill such needs is taken a way, the whole economy suffers.
Fu rt her more, where goods are nearly identical, as is the case
with  dir ect comp et itor s u sin g complem en ta ry n um bers , some
am ount  of confusion m ay be an  “un avoida ble inciden t of lawfu l,
hea lthy compet ition .”185 Wher e p urchase rs r ece ive  the s ame or
comparable goods or ser vices rega rdless  of which vendor t hey
actua lly con tact ,  a s in  the Holiday Inns II case, it could be
ar gued tha t  ther e is  no rea l danger  of confusion  a s  t o the  sou rce
of t he  goods  because the  sou rce  is  es sen t ia l ly  the  same .
However , the con fusion  wh ich  the Lanham Act  seeks to
preven t  includes confusion as to affiliat ion, as well a s  t o
source.186 Cus tom er s do n ot m er ely bu y goods; th ey als o receive
the ser vices of th e ven dor. These s er vices e xt en d t o su ch
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187. S ee Sun beam  Pr ods., Inc. v. West  Bend  Co., 123 F.3d 246, 26 0 (5th Cir .
199 7).
188. S ee Lan des & P osner , supra  note 15, at  265-66.
189. Id . at 270.
190. S ee, e.g., Allen, supra  not e 16 0, a t 8 62-63  (“[D]isal lowin g pa ssi ve r eceip t of
calls  o n a  co m pl em e n t a r y n u m b er  m ay preclu de s ome  pot en tia l comp et itor s fr om
en te r ing th e m ar ke t i f th ey ca nn ot a fford  to a dve rt ise .”).
inta ngibles a s  t he  ea se an d conven ience of workin g with
cus tomer ser vice per sonn el, th e sp eed of deliver y, an d the
responsiveness of th e compa ny to pr oblems. Certa in ly these
services also rela te t o pr ice.  Even  wh en  goods com e fr om one
suppl ie r , t he reputa t ion of the  affi lia ted vendor  is  a t  s take
based  on th e qua lity of th ese ser vices. Thu s, t he d ifference in
affilia t ion  is an important a spect of the total package of goods
and services,  a n d sh ould  be s ubject  to the s t r ict  cont rol of the
se n ior  use r  to pr eve nt  t a rn ishmen t  of it s r ep u ta t ion .
Because  these  fr ee market p r incipl es  lend some  suppor t  t o
bot h  side s of th e complem ent ar y num bers deba te, free ma rk et
t heor y alone does not a nswer  th e quest ion wheth er
complemen ta ry numbers s hould  be a fforded  t r ademark
protect ion . At  bot tom,  the  in t e res t s  of t he  fr ee market  a r e
cons is tent  wit h  the ove ra ll a pp roach  of the L an ha m Act, wh ich
is to ba lance  the coun te rva i ling pol icies of protectin g free
com pe t it ion  wh ile  pr eve nt in g con su mer  confusion  and
overreaching by mar ket part icipants.187
B. Economic E f fi ciency
 Lead ing economist s believe tha t t ra dem ark  law can best  be
explained  in t e rms of econom ic efficien cy.188 This  efficiency is
man ife st ed primarily in “the saving in search costs ma de
possible by  the  in forma t ion  or  r epu ta t ion  tha t  t he t r ademark
conveys or  embodies  abou t  the  brand  (or  the  fi rm tha t  produces
th e br an d).”189
Economic effici en cy a rgu men ts a lso su pp or t  bot h  side s of
the comple m en ta ry  number  is sue and  thus  lead to the  same
conclu sion  reached in  the d iscuss ion  of fr ee market  t heory
above. For  exa mple, s ome com men ta tors h ave p oin ted  out  tha t
economic efficiency is promoted by a llowing complem ent ar y
nu mber  holder s t he fu ll bene fit of the ir en tr epr ene ur ial
cunn ing, wit hout  the spe ct re of u n fa i r compet ition  liab ility. 190
Und er  th is  theor y, a llow in g com plementary num ber holders to
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191. S ee id .
192. The re cipi en t of a  toll-fre e t ele ph one  cal l be ar s t he  cost  of th e ca ll, w hi ch
can  be the most sign ifican t p or tion  of the cost  of owning a  toll-free n um ber . S ee infra
no te 193.  I f a  ho ld e r  of  a t oll-free nu mber  frequ ent ly received a  lar ge nu mber  of calls
from  misdia ling ca lle r s to  an  unrela ted busines s, the r esultin g expense could be
unbea rable, especially to a small business.
193. Toll-free se rv ice cos ts  ab out  $60  per  yea r p lu s lon g di st an ce char ges, based
upon th e following typical r at es: inst allat ion of new toll-free se rvice: $25; s er vice
cha rge: $5  per  month ;  ca l ling ra tes : 30¢ per  minute  in ter s ta te, 20¢  per  minu te
intra stat e. A $96  in st al la ti on  cha rg e w ill a pp ly if a  new tele phone line is t o be
i n st a lled to accomm odat e th e 800 ser vice, but t his is n ot ne cessar y. Telep h on e
Inter view with Commer cial Customer Ser vice Repr esen ta tive, U .S. West
Communica t ions Cor p. (N ov. 1 7, 1 997 ).
194. S ee Ord er, supra  not e 1, at 24 96; Comm ent s of Amer itech , supra  no te 1 , a t
re ceive calls  from m isdia ling cons um er s pr omote s efficiency an d
compet it ion  by making entry into an esta blished mar ket less
costly. This  pr omotes  compet ition  and e fficie n t  a lloca t ion  of
resour ces by e ncouraging owner s  of mnemonic numbers  to
purchase the rights to their complementar y numbers.191 After
all,  no othe r  bus iness  bu t  a  competitor would want th ese
complemen ta ry num bers because  th e misdialed calls ar e a
nu i sance and a significant  expense 192 that  the other business
ough t  not to bear. Furt hermore, the cost  of buy ing  the
complemen ta ry nu mbe rs  is r elat ively sm all. 193 I f the  or igina l
nu mber  holder  does  not  purchase the complemen ta ry numbers ,
and a compet it or  can not  us e th em, t hey w ill be ess ent ially
locked-up a nd of no use to an yone.
On the  other  hand,  why  shou l d a  m ark et pa rt icipan t be
requ ired  to go to th e expense a nd t roub le  of buying
complemen ta ry nu mber s at  th e per il of its  bus ines s? In d oing
so, it  is  en t ir ely  pos sible  tha t  a  bu sines s m ay m iss on e or  m ore
complemen ta ry numbers . Should i t  then  be pena lized for  i ts
la ck  of crea t ivi ty in  pr ed ict in g t he s chem in g m in d? The
resul tan t expen se could  be sign ifica n t  depend ing on  the  na tu re
and rela t ive  size of t he busin ess. Additionally, toll-free  numbers
a re a finite commodity. Requirin g a business to purchase
severa l nu mber s when  it only needs one h ar dly seems  an
efficient  use of resources. Th e p rolife ra t ion  of tele ph one
connect ion s i s a  signifi can t  p rob lem in  the  Un i ted S ta t es ,
espe cially sin ce th e a dven t of fax m ach ine s, m odems, in terne t
connect ions , and  ded ica ted l ines.  For  examp le, the n ew toll-free
prefix “888” was  in t roduced p reci se ly  because the  demand for
addit iona l nu mb er s h as  out st rip ped  su pply. 194 Rem oving t he
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30. In 1996, th e FCC agreed to mak e identical van ity num bers in t he new “888”
exchan ge temporarily unavailable upon request of a ho lde r  of  the  same number  in  the
“800” excha nge. S ee Ord er, supra  note 1,  at 25 04. For a complete discus sion of FCC
regu la t ions an d te leph one m nem onics, se e Dam e, supra  note 1, at  1220-22.
195. S ee generally , DOUG LAS  LAYCOCK, MO D E R N  AM E R I CA N  RE M E D I E S 525 (2d ed.
1994) ( sta t ing tha t  un jus t  enr ichment  i s undefinable ).
196. Atl an t ic Coa st  Lin e R. R. C o. v. F lor ida , 29 5 U .S.  301 , 30 9 (19 35).
197. 390 F. 2d  117  (9t h C ir . 19 68).
198. S ee id . at 121-22.
199. 15 U. S.C . § 11 17 (1 946 ).
200. Ma ier , 390 F.2d at  121.
201. Id . (quoting S. RE P . NO . 79-1 333 , a t 1 -2 (19 46)).
incentives  for  complementa ry  paras it es  would he lp  conserve the
exist ing t e lephone  in fr astru cture and minimize consumer cost
an d inconvenience.
C. Unjus t Enr ichment
 The equita ble th e or y  of u n jus t en rich men t, lik e th e law  of
unfa i r compet ition, is typically explained  in ter ms  of fairness
and good conscience. Also like u nfa ir  compet ition, lega l scholar s
a re a t  a  los s to de fin e u n just  en r ich men t  in  the a bs t ract .195
J ust ice Cardozo described it a s an y situa tion wher e a  pa r ty has
received a  benefi t  “in  such  ci rcumstances  tha t  the possessor
will give offense  to equ ity a nd  good conscience if permi tt ed to
re ta in  it.”196 As  wi th othe r  t or t s , remedies based on unjust
enr ichment ar e regula rly app lied in Lan ha m Act cases. For
examp le, in Ma ier Br ewin g Co. v. Fleischma nn  Distilling
Corp.,197 t he  Nin th  C ircu i t Cour t  of Appea l s he ld  tha t  the
Lanham Act  jus t ifi es  a  broad  appl ica t ion  of equita ble remed ies
to p reven t  un jus t  en r ichmen t .198 Afte r  not ing tha t  th e la ngu age
wit h i n § 35 of the Act 199 gives an aggrieved party a remedy
“subject to t he  pr inciple s of equit y,”200 t he  cour t  quoted  the
legisla tive  his tor y which  sh owed t ha t Con gres s in t e n ded not
mer ely to compe nsa te t r ade mark holder s for  actua l los t  or
diverted  sales, but  inten d ed  m ore  genera lly to “make[]
infringement an d piracy unp rofitable.”201
These equ itable policies argue squarely against th e Holiday
Inns II  r e su l t . As  a  mat ter  of log ic and common sense, it  har dly
seems fair or just for a busines s to be allowed  t o pr ofit th rou gh
what is  es se n t ia lly p ir acy of the a dver t is in g efforts  of another
compa ny. By the defendan ts’ own ad mis sion in  Holiday Inns II,
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202. S ee Holiday Inns II , 86  F. 3d  619 , 62 3-24  (6t h C ir . 19 96).
203. S ee Lan des & P osner , supra  not e 15, at  270  (“If the law does not prevent
i t , free r iding will even tu ally des tr oy the in forma tion ca pita l embodied  in a
t rademark, an d t he  pr ospe ct of fr ee r idin g m ay t he re fore  el imina te the  incen t ive  to
dev elop  a v al ua ble  tr ad em ar k i n t he  fir st  pla ce.”).
204. S ee Opticians Ass’n. v. Indepen dent  Opticians, 920 F.2d 187, 197 (3d C ir .
1990) (“ ‘On e en te ri ng  a fie ld a lr ea dy occu pie d by  an oth er  ha s a  du ty  to s ele ct a
t r ademark th at  will avoid con fusion  . . . .’”) (quotin g Idea l Ind us.,  I n c.  v.  Ga r dner
Bender , In c., 6 12 F .2d  101 8, 1 026  (7t h C ir . 19 79)).
th i s is precisely what happened. 202 Thus,  the use of
complemen ta ry nu mber s cont ra dicts  th e ba sic policy th at
un derlies  un fair  compet ition  law—en forcemen t of th at  which  is
fair .
But  legal prevent ion of un just en richmen t  is not just ified
solely by th e pr inciple s of fairn ess  an d good conscien ce. It a lso
provides distin ct economic benefit s. Pr eventin g one mar ket
par t icipan t  fr om  “free-r iding” on  the  coa t t a il s of anothe r  spu r s
development  of valua ble tr a demark s,203 and  u rges pa r t ie s t o
con t ract  w ith  one  another , which  in t ur n fost ers  economic
growth. F or examp le, if Bus ine ss A pr osper s beca us e of its h igh
quality pr oduct s, good re pu ta tion , an d ext en sive a dver tis ing,
and Bu sines s B  is  a llow ed  to r ide on  Bu sines s A’s coa t t a ils,
Business B’s free-riding will drive down qu a lit y r ega rdles s of
the qua lity of Bus ine ss B ’s good s  or  services. This produces a
ben efit  for  one  market  pa r t icipan t  a t  the  expense  of other
busin esses  and  the gen er al cons um ing p ub lic. Thu s, t he
pr inciple  of unjust enrichment, whether justified in terms of
fairness or  econ omics , leads  to the conclus ion  tha t  compet i tor s
ough t  not be allowed to profit from th e use of complemen ta ry
num bers of others.
D. T he Du ty  to Prev ent Confu sion
 Not  only d o a ct or s  in  t h e  market place h ave a  du ty n ot  t o
cause confusion , t hey a lso have a n  affir mat ive  du ty t o preven t
confusion . This du ty is clearly imposed in t he t ra dema rk
infringem ent  cont ext : A late comer  to a  ma rk et  ha s a  du ty t o
choose  a t ra dem ar k, or t o na me it s pr oduct  in  a  ma nn er
designed  to avoid  a ll l ik eli hood of con fusi on .204 The same
pr inciple  a lso app lie s in  the u nfa ir  compe t it ion  context : J un ior
compe t it ors ha ve an a ffirm at ive du ty to avoid or m inimize th e
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205. S ee John Wright, Inc. v. Casper  Corp., 41 9 F. S upp . 292, 315 (E .D. Pa .
197 6); see also Stix Prods.,  Inc. v. United Merchant s and Mfrs. ,  Inc., 295 F. Supp.
479, 497  (S.D .N .Y. 19 68).
206. 305 U.S . 111  (1938 ); see supra  note 13.
207. S ee Holiday Inns II , 86 F.3d at 625.
208. S ee Allen, supra note 160, at  862-63.
prospect  of confusion  among purchasers.205 Th is  same du ty was
invoked by the Suprem e Cour t  in  Kellogg Co. v. National
Biscu it Co.206 In the complementar y numbers context, as the
cour t  found in  Hol iday Inns II, the defend an t did n ot creat e th e
confusion  tha t  caused m isdialing, but  mer ely took ad vant age of
it. 207 However , th e confusion  t h a t  cause s m isdia lin g is  not  the
on ly rele va nt  confusion . Th e r ecip ien t ’s a ct ion s a ft er  the ca ll is
rece ived  may a l so con t r ibu te  to the  confus ion .
Lega l imposition of th e d u ty  to p reven t  confus ion  t ends  to
soften th e re su lt t ha t u nju st  enr ichmen t p rin ciples u rge, wh ile
s topp ing shor t  of t he  no-holds -ba r red  compet i t ion  tha t  fr ee
ma rk et  and economic e ffi ci ency  pr incipl es  t end  to suppor t .
En tirely  preven t ing  compet itor s  from holding complementa ry
n umbers, as  th e un jus t e nr ichm en t r at iona le su ggest s, w ou ld
cer ta in ly fulfill th e du ty t o p r even t  confus ion .  Th is approach ,
however, is a bit ext rem e. With an  affirmat ive duty t o prevent
con fu si on , compet it or s  cou l d h ol d a n d  pr ofi t  fr om
complemen ta ry numbers , so long  as th ey took  adequa te s t eps  to
a lla y con fusion .
Where  the number  holder  has a  complementa ry  number  and
knows or  ought  to know tha t  some s ign ifi can t  por t ion  of ca l ls  it
receives a re from mis dia ling cons um er s, it  ma y fulfill th is lega l
obliga t ion  by pr oviding a  clear explana tory mes sage a t t he
begin n i n g of the ca ll.  If a  ca ll r ecip ien t  ade qu a tely  in forms
callers of their  possible or  pr obable  mist ak e, and  gives adequa te
informa t ion  to pr eve nt  any a dd it ion a l con fusion , t he li keli hood
of confu sion should be adequately remedied. At the very least,
the us e of such p reca ut ions s hou ld be an  impor t an t  factor  in  the
“likelih ood of confu sion” an alys is.208
A simple or  va gu e id en t ifica t ion  a t  the be gin n in g of a
tele ph one call may be inadequat e. It ma y  go unheard  or  be
misunderst ood. Also, since ma ny toll-free n um bers a re r outed
through answering services, many callers may simply assum e
tha t  th e a ns wer ing p ar ty, r egard less of i t s name, i s the
answer ing or customer support service for the intended
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209. F o r exam ple, in  many ma jor  me t ropol it an  a reas,  compe t ing  pr in t  newspape r s
ha ve either been  bought by a single corp orat e ent ity or h ave consolida ted p rin tin g,
ma rk etin g, an d oth er s ervices t o save  cost s as  th eir m ar ket  sha re dw indles . In Sa lt
Lake Cit y, for  exa mp le,  if a  c us t om e r  want ed to call to subscribe to either  the Deser et
News o r  t he  Sa l t  Lake  Tribune,  the  subscr ip t ion  depar tment  numbers  a re listed
sepa ra tely  un d e r  t h e nam e of each newspa per in th e telephone directory. However,
the phone call s for both a ctually go to the same indepen dent compan y, Newspaper
Agen cy Cor por at ion , wh ich  ans wers  wit h it s own  na me  an d ca n p rov ide  su bscr ipt ions
for  e ithe r  or  both .
210. S ee supra  note 165 .
211. S ee Holiday Inns II , 86 F.3d at 621.
212. S ee Holiday Inns I , 83 8 F . Su pp . 12 47,  125 2-53  (E. D. T en n.  199 3).
213. In  H o li d a y I n ns II, the Sixth  Circuit also noted  with a pproval th at by
answer ing ca ll s t ha t  othe rwise  wen t  unanswered,  t he defenda nt  ma y actu ally ha ve
been help ing elim ina te con fusion . S ee Holiday Inns II , 86 F.3d  a t  625.  Th i s a rgumen t
tends  to support  the court ’s resu lt but  is pitifully weak . I t  s eems  t an tamoun t  to
saying tha t  a  d r iver  i s be tt e r  s erved  to keep  d r iv ing  and r ema in  lost withou t knowing
i t , than  to reach a dead end. In m ost cases, the dead end wo ul d s e em  to be a better
ind icat or  of the t rue situ ation an d should ultima tely save time a nd expense.
214. S ee Lan des & P osner , supra  note 15, at  266.
par ty.209 A misd ia l ing cus tomer  who i s aware of th i s commer cial
p ract i ce ma y presu me t ha t t hey ha ve dialed a compleme n ta ry
nu mber  when  they have  not  or , conver se ly , tha t  they have
rea ched th e corr ect nu mber  when  in fact th ey ha ve dia led a
complemen ta ry num ber. If th e recipient of the call does
noth ing,  it  add  to th i s confus ion .
The Holiday Inns II cour t  d id  not  impose  the d u t y t o
preven t  confus ion  upon  the  de fendan t .  In  Holiday Inns II, t he
defendan t ’s phones were all a llegedly an swered  by the r ecorded
message r e fe r r ed  to above.210 The message explained that t he
caller had not reached Holiday Inns or  a n y  of its a ffiliate s, a nd
s ta ted t h a t an operator would be available shortly to help the
misd ia l ing caller find th eir int ended n um ber, or ma ke a  hotel
res erva tion  at  Holiday Inn  or one of severa l ot he r  hote l cha ins
men tioned by name .211 Whet her  each  caller  h e a r d th is m ess age
and exactly what  th e mess age contain ed wer e  m a jor points of
conten t ion  in  the  di st r ict  cou r t  hea rin g.212 Nevert heless, a  clear
explana tory message is a simple, reasonable, and easy step to
remedy or  p reven t  confus ion  from complemen ta ry number
holders in the same business.213
E. Portability and Property Rights
 T h e economic ana lys is  of t r ademark  law draws h eavily  on
the econ om ics of property rights. 214 As with rea l property law,
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215. S ee id .
216. S ee id . (“[A] firm  is le ss l ike ly t o exp en d r esou rce s on  dev elop ing a new
product  if compe tin g firms t ha t h ave  n o t bor ne  th e ex pen se  of dev elop me nt  can
dup li ca t e t he  p roduct  and  p roduce  it  at t he s am e m ar gin al cos t a s t he  inn ovat or;
comp et iti on  will drive price down to marginal cost,  and th e su nk  cost s of in ven tion
will no t b e r ecou pe d.”).
217. S ee id .
218. F o r a good gene ra l discuss ion of the t oll-free t elephone indus t ry and  the
por t ab il it y of toll-free nu mbe rs, s ee H orky, supra note 83, at  229.
219. S ee id .
220. S ee id .
221. Id .
the essence of trademar k law is the right to exclude.2 1 5 Such
exclus ive right s provide both costs an d ben e fi t s. The p rim ar y
benefit is th e incentive to use a  fin it e r e source  in  the  mos t  cos t -
efficient  way and  to impr ove tha t  r esource  in  an t i cipa t ion  of
even tua l per sona l en r ichmen t .2 1 6 However, property rights also
in t roduce t r ans fe r  cos t s , r ent  seeking (i.e., promotion costs),
cost s of p rotect ion  and  enforcem ent , and  the cos t  of r est r i ct ing
use of pr ope r ty wh ich  has a  pu bli c good.217 As  with  f ree  market
prin ciples in gener al, th ese compet ing inter ests  ur ge a
regulatory approach that  balances the interests.
In  order  t o adequa tely ba lance  these int e res t s , t he  natu re  of
the p r op er ty sh ould  dicta te in  la rge m ea su re t he n a ture of t he
lega l st ructure t ha t  pr otect s i t . Th us,  the n a ture of t el ep h one
numbers and t heir  unde r lying t ech nology ou gh t  to in form  the
ra t iona le beh ind  thei r  prot ect ion . An under sta ndin g of toll-free
tele ph one technology and  how it  works  is  essen t ia l to any
discu ssion  of possible solutions to its inh erent  weakn esses. One
impor tan t  aspect of toll-free telephone technology and r elat ed
law  is t he  concept  of porta bilit y.21 8 Fr om t he b rea k-up  of AT&T
unt il 1993, t oll-fr ee  tele ph one numbers were a ss ign ed  in  block s
of 10,000 t o individu a l  long distance companies.219 A cust omer
could not  change long  di stance  prov iders  and r e t a in  the  same
toll-free  num ber. However, as a result of FCC regulations t h a t
t ook effect in May 1993, toll-free teleph one nu mber s becam e
fully port able .2 2 0  As a  res u lt , a  toll-fr ee  cust omer  can  sw it ch
ca r r ie r s (e.g., fr om  AT&T to MCI) and keep t heir t oll-free
nu mber  an d its corresp onding mn emonic. As one comm enta tor
has point ed out, the advent of portability “means t hat  the
t elephone company does  not  ‘own’ the  t elephone  number ; the
customer does.”221
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222. S ee id . at  231. Int eres tin gly,  th is ch ar act er iza ti on  of th e r igh ts  of th e
num ber  holder  is quit e simila r t o a leas e of real pr opert y.
223. The re ar e bo th  sim ila ri ti es  an d s ign ific a n t differences. On the one han d,
t e lephone mnemonics  and  domain  names  may both  serve as  an  ea sy w ay of
remember ing how to conta ct a provider of goods or services. Lik ewis e, bot h t ele ph one
m nemonics  and doma in nam es may contain a  tra demar k, such as 1-800-CALLATT®
and “in te l. com,” or  they  may becom e fa m ous th emselves, su ch as 1-800-COLLECT®
and “yah oo.com. ” Most  im por ta nt ly, bot h  te lep hon e m ne mon ics a nd  dom ai n n am es  can
each  only  occur  once  in a  give n e xcha ng e or  ar ea  code, i n t he  cas e of t ele ph one
numbers,  or Top Level Domain (TLD), in the case of domain n ames. While this does
no t mak e each possible combination str ictly unique (because t her e are m ult iple
exchanges  an d m ult iple  TLD ’s), by  far  th e m ost  val ua ble a nd  des ir ed t ele ph one
exchanges  are 800 and 888, because they have nat ionwide coverage, and th e TLD
used  by commer cial enterprises  is “.com.” S ee Ira  S. Na th ens on, Com men t, Showdown
at the Domain Nam e Corral: Property R igh ts  an d P erson al J ur isd icti on O ver
Squ atters, Poach ers a nd  Ot her  Par asi tes ,  58 U. P ITT . L. RE V. 911 , 96 6-68  (199 7).
However , a t ele ph one  mn em onic m ay com pr ise  no m ore  t han seven characters,
while  a d oma in n am e m ay com pr ise  up  to 2 6 ch ar act er s. Add iti ona lly, t ele ph one
mn emon ics ne cess ar ily cor re spon d t o one  an d on ly on e s pe cific telephone num ber over
time,  whereas  domain  names can  be  a rb it ra r ily assign ed  (and  reassigned) to  any
par t icu la r Int ern et P rot ocol (IP) addr ess. See id . at  966. Also,  beca u se  each  o f t he
numbers on a telephone keypad or dial (except the num ber 1) corresponds to thr ee
l et t e r s of th e a lph ab et , m ul ti ple  mn em on ics c an  be d er ive d fr om a s ing le n um ber . For
example, t he telep hone  nu mber  corres pondin g to th e mn emon ic 1-800-SEAFOOD could
also correspond to 800-SEAFONE , 800-READ-ONE, 800-SEADOME, 800-PEAFOOD,
and others. In addition to the seven digit limitation, telephone mnemonics are also
limited by the absen ce of the lett ers Q an d Z from th e teleph o ne keyp ad. See id.  a t
967.
Effective  “ownersh ip” of th e nu mber  by th e customer  ar gues
against  th e Hol iday Inns II resu lt, an d th e jungle wa r fa re
economics  tha t  it  suppor t s . I f the  owner  of a  mnemonic number
is deemed t o have right s in t he n um ber su perior t o everyon e
but th e t eleph one comp an y,222 t he  law should recognize t he fu ll
spect rum of pr opert y righ ts , includ ing exclus ive righ ts  in t he
means chosen to help associate the num ber with goods or
services. Complementa ry  numbers ma y be viewe d t o infrin ge
those exclusive rights just as a n ew high r ise ma y infringe a
ne ighbor ing p roper ty  owner ’s  r igh t  t o sunsh ine , or  a  pa r t icu la r
view.
F. In ternet D om ai n  N am e Cases
 Recent  disput es involving th e Int ern et h ave noted  t he
similar ities between  tele ph one m nem onics an d dom ain
nam es.223 In  fact , t he P a ten t  and T rade mark Office ’s p olicy of
a l lowing federal r egistra tion of inter net  domain  na mes evolved
from cour t  ru l ings holding tha t  tele ph one m nem onics an d r ad io
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224. S ee Debora h H owitt , WA R .COM: Why the Ba ttles Over Domain N am es Will
N ever  Cease, 19 HASTINGS CO M M . & E N T . L.J . 719 , 73 1 (19 97).
225. S ee 44 U .S. P. Q.2 d 1 156  (N. D. C al . 19 97).
226. S ee id . at 1156-58.
227. S ee J ew s for  J es us  v. B ro ds ky , 46  U. S.P .Q. 2d  165 2, 1 656 -57 (D .N .J . 19 98).
La te r , after receiving a cease and des ist letter  from the plaint iff, Brodsky proceeded
to reg is ter  a  sec on d d om ain  name,  “je ws -for -jes us.com .” Id . at  1658 ; see also Jews for
Jesus  are Asking Exactly Who’s for Jesus?, NAT’L L.J ., Feb.  16, 1998, at A27.
228. Brodsky, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1657.
229. Id . at 1658 n .15.
230. On  Oct. 4, 1983, J ews for J esu s obta ined U .S. Reg. No. 1,252,8 89 for  th e
s t a t ion  call letters a re registra ble.224 Recen t  de cis ion s on
t radema rk infr ingem ent  an d u nfa ir comp etit ion claim s
involving domain n ames h ave, cont ra ry to th e Holiday Inns II
de cis ion , protected domain  na me s from  complem en ta ry or
pa ra sit ic nam es. F or exa mp le, in Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v.
Calvin  Des ign er L ab el, a  federal  distr ict cour t r ecently enjoined
an  adu lt -or i en ted int e rnet  web sit e owner  from u sin g its
domain names  “pla yboyxxx. com” an d “pl aym ateli ve. com”
because  such  use cons t itu ted in fr ingement  and  unfa i r
compe t it ion .225 Alth ou gh a t leas t one of these doma in na mes
ar guably does  n ot  in fr in ge a  regi st er ed  t r ade mark of Pla yboy
Enter p r ises, In c., t he cou r t  found t ha t  unfa ir  compe t it ion  had
been  proven .226
In  an other  recen t  ca se, St even B rods ky cre at ed a  web sit e
b ea r ing th e addr ess “www.jewsforjesus.org” which contain ed
in forma t ion  oppose d t o the views a nd a ct ivit ies  of th e
eva ngel ica l group, J ews for J esu s, wh ose official web s ite is
found at  “www.jew s-for-jesu s.org.”227 J ews for  J esu s’ official sit e
con ta ins information related to the group’s belief that  Jesus is
t he J ewish  Mess ia h . Br ods ky ’s w eb si t e con ten de d t ha t  “[t]h e
J ews for  J e sus cu l t i s founded  upon  dece it  and  di stor t ion  of
fact” and th at  “[t]he w hole progra m [of J ews for J esus ] is based
on deceit an d tr ickery, preying on people w h o a r e confuse d.”228
Br odsk y’s page provided a  link to the web si t e of Out rea ch
Juda i sm, an d advised u sers  to follow th is link “to lear n  m ore
about  how the Jews for J esu s cult  is found ed u pon d eceit a nd
dist ort ion of fact .”229 Upon  consider at ion of th e p la in t iff ’s  cl a ims
of t r ademark  in fr ingemen t  and  unfa i r  compet it ion ,  the federa l
dist rict  cour t h eld squa rely for J ews for J esus  a nd enjoined
Br odsk y’s use of these  terms. The court  ruled that  Jews for
Jesu s’ nam e and feder a lly registered t ra dema rk 230 were
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se rv ice mark “Jews fbr J esu s.” See id.  at 1656.
231. S ee id . at 1670.
232. Id . at  166 2 (cit at ion s om it te d).
pr otecta ble under st ate an d federal law, and that  Brod sk y’s use
of th ese tr adem ar ks crea t e d a  l ike lihood  of confus ion .231 Of
greatest  inter est t o the pr esent  discussion, th e cour t point ed
out  th at  “[i]n order  t o const it u te in fr in gem en t , exact
similar ities ar e not  req uir ed bet ween  th e allege dly confusin g
mar ks. Rat her , it is sufficient t ha t  enou gh of th e ma rk  is
confusin gly sim ilar  or h as  been  us ed t o deceive t he  pu blic.”232
Applying  th is  s ame  reason ing  to t e leph one m nem onics, it
shou ld not  be necessa ry  tha t t he  mnemonic number  and  the
complemen ta ry mn emon ic be m ir ror  images for  t he  cour t s  t o
protect  m n e m on ic number  holders. Rat her , it should be
suffi cien t  if the complem ent a r y  a nd  mnemonic numbers  a re
confusin gly s imi la r  or  the  complemen ta ry nu mber  ha s been
used  to deceive the public, as was the case in  bot h  Hol iday Inns
I & II.
Because  of th e di ffer en ces  be tween  In ter net  and t ele ph one
te chn ology, the domain nam e controversy may not provide
much as sist an ce to t he  complem en ta ry n um ber  an alys is.
Nevertheless, th ese cases h ave come down on the side of
protect ing p roper ty  r igh t s in  i n tern et doma in na mes
( a l p h a n u m e r i c d e s i gn a t i on s  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h
tele communica t ion s) and, thu s, suppor t  the  conclusion  tha t
complemen ta ry nu mbe rs  dese rve lega l p r ot ection from pirates,
free-riders, and other parasites.
VI. CO N C L U S I O N
 As a clever and popular adver tis ing d evice, a  teleph one
mn emon ic is  pr otect able  unde r  fed er a l t r ade mark la w s o lon g
as it  is dis t in ct ive  enough  to funct ion  a s  a  designa tor  of sou rce
or  qua lity. Th e La nh am  Act provides  a civil ca u se of a ct ion  for
t r ademar k infr ingem ent  aga ins t a ny p ers on wh o uses  in
commer ce an y rep rodu ction, cou n t er feit , copy, or  color able
imit a t ion  of a re gis t ered mnemonic mar k tha t causes a
likelihood of confusion a mong consum ers.
In  sp it e  of t he esta blished pr inciples of tr adem ar k
distinctiveness, howeve r, s ome cour ts  ha ve extend ed tr adem ar k
pr otection  to tele ph one mnem onics tha t include gen eric term s
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for  the offe red  goods or  se rvice s,  su ch  as 1 -800-MATTRES S for
a  m a t t res s d ea ler , or  1-80 0-76 0-CAS H for a  len de r . Par t  of th e
reason for  th is ext ens ion  of p rotect ion  was the  now
discont inued  pr act ice of th e Pa ten t a nd  Tra dem ar k Office in
regi ste r ing th ese m ar ks . Thou gh t he fed era l court s a re s till
split  on  th i s mat te r , the  bas ic p r inciples  of t r ademark  law
outlined  in  the Dranoff-Perlstein ca se u rge  t he comm on-sense
res ult  th at  a gen eric m ar k is s till  generic regar dless of whether
it is  us ed in  a  t ele ph one mn em onic. Recen t P TO a dm inis tr at ive
guidelines  requir e t h is  app roach  to regi st ra t ion  of tele ph one
mn emonics, and th e cour ts sh ould follow.
However , complementa ry mnemonics  a re a  more  t roub ling
mat t e r . Complemen ta ry nu mber s by th eir very na tu re pr esent
poten t ia l commercia l abuses tha t  cou ld ha rm the fr ee market
system  an d ha mper  economic progress. In  th e Holiday I nns II
case, th e Sixt h Cir cuit ’s rejection  of liabilit y aga ins t a  pa ra sit ic
complemen ta ry number  holde r  cor rect ly app lied  the Lanham
Act  i n  t h e tra demark  context: the defendant s had never used a
copy or  color able  im it a t ion  of a  Holiday Inns  t rademark.
However , th e cour t of appeals m isun der s t ood an d misa pplied
the u nfa ir  compe t it ion  pr ovis ion s of t he Lanham Act .
Unfa i r compet ition is  m ean t  to be a  b roader  tor t  than
t r ademark infr ingemen t. Wher e tr adem ar k infrin gement
r equires  the u se  of a cop y or  colorable  im it a t ion  of a regi st ered
mark, un fa i r compet it ion  only r equ ire s t he  us e of an y device
likely to cause confusion. A teleph one nu mber , w h et her in  its
nu mer ic or m nem onic form , is a d evice with in t h e  or dinary
meaning of th e word. The Sixth  Circuit essen tia lly mer ged
t r ademark and  un fa i r compet i t ion  in to one  cote rminous  tor t .
This  decision wa s err oneous, and  its fau lty ra tionale sh ould be
rejected by futu re court s th at  confront  th e issue.
On balan ce, the funda men t a l  legal and  economic policies
beh ind the  Lanham Act  and  commercia l law  in gen er al a rgu e
against  th e Hol iday Inns II resu lt. The t otal, un fetter ed righ t  t o
obta in  and u se  a  mnem onic com plem en ta ry t o a  compe t it or ’s
esta blished nu mber  seems  on th e sur face to promote free
m ark et  policies. However , it can  ha ve th e opposit e effect in  t he
same way m onopolies discour age qu ali t y  and  compet it ion .
Likewise, economic efficiency argu men ts sup port both
conclu sions.  F ree  a ccess t o complemen ta ry nu mber s prom otes
easy access into th e ma rk et, an d promotes  efficient  a lloca t ion  of
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tele ph one numbers  to the  cust omers wh o really want  th em.
However , it s eem s in efficient  to effective ly requ ire a m ar ket
competitor to buy assets th at it  does not really want or need.
The pr inciple s u nd er lying u nju s t  en r ichmen t , t he  du ty to
preven t  confus ion , and  proper ty r igh t s a rgu e s qu arely  for
increas ed pr otection  for owner s of mn emon ic nu mbers against
holde r s of complementa ry  numbers . Recent  int ern et d oma in
name cases  ha ve dr awn  hea vily from t eleph one m nem onic cases
in  r ecogn i zin g p r ope r t y r igh t s i n  t ele com m unica t ion s
designat ions. In  the end, st rict  enfor cemen t of th e du ty t o
preven t  confusion will best serve both t he int erest s of th e free
market , w h ile sim ult an eous ly pr otect ing p rope rt y righ ts  an d
preven t ing unjust  enr ichment . In th e complem ent ar y num ber
context , th is du ty will a llow comp etit ors t o hold an d pr ofit from
complemen ta ry numbers so long as they tak e adequate steps to
alla y confusion. Such steps should include, a t  a  min imum, a
clear expla na tor y mes sa ge at  th e begin nin g of th e call. Th is will
ensu re tha t  compet it or s a re n ot  add in g t o consu mer  confusion
and pr ofiting p ur ely at  th e exp en se  of another ’s e ffor t , expense,
and adver t is in g. To the ext en t  tha t  a  compe t it or  doe s n ot
provide an  adequ at e explana tory mes sage,  an  act ion  for  unfa i r
compe t it ion  should lie. Like wise, t o t he  ex ten t  t ha t  a  compet i tor
advert ises a complementar y number in its mnemonic form, she
should be held lia ble for eith er in frin geme nt  or un fair
com pet it ion . These will obviously be factu al inqu iries th at  will
d ep en d on t he  spe cific facts  an d circu ms ta nces  of each ca se. If
fu tur e cour t s  ana lyze  complementa ry  numbers  in  th i s way,  the
cour t s wil l give m ore effect  to the u nde r lyin g pu rpos e of t he
Lanham Act and sim ilar  st at e law s t ha n t he cour t d id in
Holiday Inns II. Moreover, th e cour ts will promote r obust ,
h e a lthy compet ition. App licat ion of thes e ru les will st rike a
ba lance between  p r om ot i n g e con omic compet it ion  and
pr otect in g prope r ty r igh t s a nd p reve nt in g con su mer  confusion .
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